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UNDRIP AND THE INTERVENTION:  
INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION, PARTICIPATION, AND 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION  
IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA 
Anna Cowan † 
Abstract: The adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”) by the General Assembly in 2007 was a landmark 
achievement in the development of indigenous rights under international law, particularly 
through its unequivocal recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.  
That same year, Australia launched a comprehensive Intervention into Aboriginal 
communities in the Northern Territory, which purported to safeguard important human 
rights but was heavily criticized for its discriminatory and non-consultative approach.  
This article explores the meaning of self-determination under international law, now that 
the long debate over whether indigenous peoples are “peoples” has finally been resolved.  
It then uses the result of that analysis as the basis for a critique of Australia’s 
methodology in the Intervention.  The article argues that self-determination entails the 
right of a people to control their own affairs through freedom from discrimination and 
meaningful participation in decision-making, and that the scope of self-determination 
must be the same for indigenous peoples as for ‘all peoples’ under international law.  
When assessed against these criteria, it is clear that Australia’s Intervention methodology 
fell well short of the requirements of empowerment inherent in these established and 
evolving international human rights standards.  As Australia moves beyond the 
Intervention towards Stronger Futures it is imperative that the mistakes of an approach 
based on discrimination and a failure to foster genuine participation by Aboriginal 
peoples are not continued.  The lessons of the Intervention are relevant for other states 




Let us never forget this: . . . Australia’s treatment of her 
aboriginal people will be the thing upon which the rest of the 
world will judge Australia and Australians–not just now, but in 
the greater perspective of history.1 
                                                      
† LL.B (Hons) (Victoria Univ. of Wellington, NZ), BA (Victoria Univ. of Wellington, NZ), LL.M 
(University of Cambridge, UK).  Research Associate to Professor James Crawford SC, Lauterpacht Centre 
for International Law, Cambridge, UK and formerly solicitor in the civil law section at the North Australian 
Aboriginal Justice Agency, Darwin, Australia.  Many thanks to Dr. Jessie Hohmann, Jonathon Hunyor and 
Cecily Rose for their useful comments and advice.  Any errors are my own.  None of the views expressed 
here purport to reflect the views of my current or previous employers. 
1  Extract from 1972 speech by former Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, in E.G. WHITLAM, 
ON AUSTRALIA’S CONSTITUTION 301 (1977).  As the author does not identify as either Australian or 
indigenous, the arguments in this article are presented from the perspective of an interested observer, in the 
style of Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 1-16 
(James Crawford ed., 1988).   
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Colonization, development, and modern “progress” have resulted in 
widespread marginalization for indigenous peoples in Australia2 and around 
the world.3  Virtually all indigenous peoples share common problems arising 
from systematic and persistent human rights violations, with indigenous 
status correlating closely with poverty.4 
Against this background of disadvantage and oppression, the year 
2007 saw the achievement of a “milestone of re-empowerment” 5  for 
indigenous peoples.  On September 13, 2007, the United Nations (“UN”) 
General Assembly (“GA”) adopted the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”) by an overwhelming majority.6  It was the 
culmination of an arduous drafting process that spanned more than two 
decades, with unprecedented participation by indigenous representatives.7  
As a result, the final declaration is a compromise between state and 
indigenous perspectives, rather than a purely state-driven instrument–
unusual in international law.8  Undoubtedly the most significant outcome is 
that UNDRIP is the first international legal instrument expressly to 
recognize that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. 9  
                                                      
2  See, e.g., Diane Otto, A Question of Law or Politics? Indigenous Claims to Sovereignty in 
Australia, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 65 (1995); Peter Grose, Developments in the Recognition of 
Indigenous Rights in Canada: Implications for Australia?, JAMES COOK U. L. REV. 68 (1997); Michael 
Dodson & Lisa Strelein, Australia’s Nation-Building: Renegotiating the Relationship Between Indigenous 
People and the State, 24 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 826 (2001); Julie Cassidy, The Legacy of Colonialism, 51 
AM. J. COM. L. 409, 409 (2003); Deirdre Howard-Wagner, Restoring Social Order Through Tackling 
‘Passive Welfare’: The Statutory Intent of the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 
(Cth) and Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Act 2007 (Cth), 19 
CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 243 (2007); Jennifer Martiniello, Howard’s New Tampa: Aboriginal 
Children Overboard, 26 AUST. FEMINIST L.J. 123 (2007); Michael Murphy, Representing Indigenous Self-
Determination, 58(2) U. TORONTO L. J. 185 (2008); John Chesterman & Heather Douglas, Law on 
Australia’s Northern Frontier: The Fall and Rise of Race, 24 CAN. J. L. & SOC'Y 69 (2009). 
3  See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 74TH CONFERENCE (the Hague, 2010) 
834-923 [hereinafter ILA REPORT].  
4  See generally, Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global 
Comparative and International Legal Perspective, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 98 (1999); Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Closing a Gap in Global Governance, 11 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 17 (2005); Asbjørn Eide, Rights of Indigenous Peoples–Achievements in International Law 
During the Last Quarter of a Century, 37 NETHERLANDS Y.B. OF INT’L L. 155, 184 (2006).  For further 
discussion of “aboriginal syndrome,” see Cassidy, supra note 2. 
5  Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1142 (2008). 
6  U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).  The vote breakdown for this resolution was 143 in 
favor, 4 against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States), and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa, Ukraine).   
7  See, e.g., ILA Report, supra note 3, at 836-40.  
8  See, e.g., Maivân Lâm, Making Room for Peoples at the United Nations: Thoughts Provoked by 
Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 25 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 603, 621 (1992); KAREN KNOP, 
DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2002). 
9  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 3, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP]. 
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Although UNDRIP is not legally binding, this development provides 
important legal recognition of a struggle for empowerment that had 
previously been largely political in nature,10 and offers an opportunity to 
reconcile competing understandings of the content and scope of the right of 
self-determination in international law.11   
The first purpose of this paper is to take up that opportunity by 
examining and defining the meaning of self-determination now that it has 
been extended to indigenous peoples in UNDRIP.  While there is vast 
literature covering the development of the draft Declaration, and the 
question of whether or not self-determination would ultimately be included 
(and in what form), there has been comparatively little analysis of what self-
determination actually means–for indigenous peoples specifically and for 
“all peoples” more generally–now that it is unequivocally recognized in 
UNDRIP.12  This article aims to contribute to the literature by arguing that 
the meaning of self-determination following UNDRIP’s adoption is 
consistent with traditional understandings of the right as recognized for “all 
peoples,”13 not at odds with them.  To clear away some of the controversy 
around indigenous self-determination and facilitate its implementation on a 
practical level, self-determination can be defined quite simply as a people’s 
right to control its own affairs through freedom from discrimination and 
meaningful participation in decision-making.   
The second purpose of the article is to apply this interpretation to 
important events unfolding in Australia.  Specifically, the article uses these 
evolving international standards of self-determination as the criteria for a 
critical assessment of key aspects of the methodology used by the Australian 
federal government in its intervention into Aboriginal communities in the 
                                                      
10  Chris Tennant, Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions, and the International Legal 
Literature from 1945-1993, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 42-45 (1994). 
11  Caroline Foster, Articulating Self-Determination in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 141 (2001).  
12  Exceptions include various chapters in REFLECTIONS ON THE U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS 
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS ON 
THE UNDRIP]; Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in the Context of Human Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 141 (2011); Lorie Graham & Siegfried 
Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty, Culture, and International Human Rights Law, 110 S. ATLANTIC Q. 403 
(2011); Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Self-Determination, Culture, and Land: A Reassessment in Light of 
the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF THE 
UN DECLARATION 31, 44-7 (Elvira Pulitano ed., 2012). 
13  See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].  See also the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 20(1), 
June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 363 (recognizing the “unquestionable and inalienable right to self-
determination” of all peoples).  The UN Charter refers to the “principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples” in arts. 1(2) and 55. 
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Northern Territory of Australia (“NT”).  Known as the NT National 
Emergency Response (“NTER”) or simply “the Intervention,” this wide-
ranging initiative was launched in 2007, the same year that UNDRIP was 
adopted.  The Intervention was triggered by the report of an inquiry into 
child abuse in remote Aboriginal communities known as the Little Children 
Are Sacred Report.14  The report documented the desperate living conditions 
and general social breakdown that had precipitated the serious child abuse 
problem, and predicted an impending disaster for Australia if urgent action 
was not taken to address entrenched disadvantage in indigenous 
communities in NT.15   
In response, Australia implemented a complicated legislative package 
introducing reforms that touched on almost all aspects of everyday life in the 
communities affected.  The federal government said the Intervention would 
take important steps to protect children, to implement Australia’s obligations 
under human rights treaties, and to advance the human rights of indigenous 
peoples suffering the “crisis of community dysfunction.”16   There is no 
disputing that Australia was faced with an extremely serious and complex 
situation, and that drastic action was urgently needed to protect the rights of 
Aboriginal peoples, particularly children and women, in NT communities.  
In that respect the Intervention represented an encouraging sign that the 
federal government was willing to take these problems seriously and commit 
significant resources to making improvements, to bring conditions in NT 
into line with its obligations under international human rights law.   
Unfortunately, Australia’s methodology and approach were seriously 
flawed from a human rights perspective, and any initial optimism soon gave 
way to intense criticism of the Intervention.  The criticism centered on the 
suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (“RDA”),17 and the fact 
that the discriminatory measures were imposed wholly without consultation.  
In other words, by UNDRIP standards, both the foundations for self-
determination in the definition articulated above were absent.  
                                                      
14  REX WILD QC & PAT ANDERSON, REPORT OF THE NT BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE PROTECTION 
OF ABORIGINAL CHILDREN FROM CHILD ABUSE, AMPE AKELYERNEMANE MEKE MEKARLE: LITTLE 
CHILDREN ARE SACRED (2007), available at http://www.inquirysaac.nt.gov.au/pdf/bipacsa_final_report.pdf 
[hereinafter LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED]. 
15  LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14, at 6. 
16  Commonwealth Games Association (“CGA”), House of Representatives, Northern Territory 
National Emergency Response Bill 2007 Explanatory Memorandum, 76, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/ntnerb2007541/ memo_0.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) 
(hereinafter NTERB Explanatory Memorandum), 76. 
17  Northern Territory Emergency Response Act 2007 [hereinafter NTERA] (Cth) s 132(2) (Austl.).  
The Intervention also overrode contrary provisions of Northern Territory anti-discrimination laws.  NTERA 
s 133(2).  This article solely considers the federal act.  
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NTER was subsequently amended in an attempt to address these 
concerns,18 but many believe the redesign did not remedy the destructive 
effects of the initial approach.19  Now, five years later, the life of NTER is 
ostensibly over, as the key legislated areas were set to expire in August 
2012.20  Australia has just passed new legislation to replace NTER,21 having 
undertaken the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory consultations in 
June-August 2011.22  Accordingly, it is timely to step back and re-examine 
why NTER approach was not the answer, in light of UNDRIP.   
This is not simply a retrospective exercise in finger-pointing.  The 
new legislation has a life-span of 10 years, with the first independent review 
scheduled for 3 years after commencement.23  Significant resources have 
been committed to its implementation by the federal and Northern Territory 
(“NT”) governments, but serious concerns remain over the processes and 
methods by which the legislation was developed and approved.  As Australia 
is on the threshold of the next phase of its campaign to improve living 
conditions in NT communities, it is imperative that the methodological 
mistakes of the Intervention are not repeated, and that UNDRIP is used as 
guidance to ensure that the positive intentions behind the Intervention and 
                                                      
18  Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of Racial 
Discrimination Act) Act 2010 (Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter WWRDA]. 
19  See, e.g., Alison Vivian, NTER Redesign Consultation Process: Not Very Special, 14 AUSTRALIA 
INDIGENOUS L. REV. 46 (2010); Alastair Nicholson et al., Will They Be Heard? A Response to NTER 
Consultations: June to August 2009 (2009); Amnesty International, Submission No. 19 to Senate Standing 
Committee on Community Affairs (Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate 
/committee/clac_ctte/soc_sec_welfare_reform_racial_discrim_09/submissions/sub19.pdf; Rights and Equal 
Opportunities Commission (HREOC), The Suspension and Reinstatement of the RDA and Special 
Measures in NTER (2011), available at http://www.hreoc.gov. au/racial_discrimination/publications/rda-
nter/NTERandRDAPublication12%20December2011.pdf [hereinafter HREOC Report on RDA and Special 
Measures]. 
20  In 2009 NTER transitioned to a “development” phase under the Closing the Gap in the Northern 
Territory National Partnership Agreement.  For an overview, see CGA, Closing the Gap: Prime Minister’s 
Report (2011), available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/closing_the_gap/ 
2011_ctg_pm_report/Documents/2011_ctg_pm_report.pdf [hereinafter Closing the Gap: Prime Minister’s 
Report].  
21  Three related bills were referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs on 
November 25, 2011, and remained open for submissions until February 1, 2012: Stronger Futures in the 
Northern Territory Bill 2011 (Cth) (Austl.); Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory (Consequential and 
Transitional Provisions) Bill 2011 (Cth) (Austl.), and Social Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2011 
(Cth) (Austl.).  The Committee reported on March 14, 2012 and the bills were passed by the Senate at the 
third reading in the early hours of June 29, 2012. 
22  CGA, STRONGER FUTURES IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY: DISCUSSION PAPER (June 2011), 
available at http://www.indigenous.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/s_futures_discussion_paper.pdf; 
CGA, STRONGER FUTURES IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY: POLICY STATEMENT (November 2011), 
available at http://www.indigenous.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Stronger_Futers_policy_statement 
_nov2011.pdf [sic] [hereinafter CGA, STRONGER FUTURES POLICY STATEMENT]; CGA, STRONGER 
FUTURES IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY: REPORT ON CONSULTATIONS (Oct. 2011), available at 
http://www.indigenous.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 10/consult_1710111.pdf. 
23  See STRONGER FUTURES IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY ACT 2012 (Cth), ss 117, 118 (Austl.). 
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the Stronger Futures package can be built upon to maximum effect.  There 
are valuable lessons to be learned about the importance of fostering self-
determination, of relevance not just to Australia, but in the context of 
indigenous-state relations anywhere.   
Section II sets up the criteria for assessing the Australian approach by 
exploring the meaning of self-determination for indigenous peoples under 
UNDRIP.  It briefly considers different understandings of self-determination 
before analyzing the content and scope of self-determination under 
UNDRIP.  It argues that the core normative foundations on which 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination depends are the same 
foundations underpinning the right of self-determination long recognized for 
“all peoples” under international law:  the right to participation and the right 
to be free from discrimination.  Both are well-established rights in 
themselves, but UNDRIP demands a higher standard of participation in 
decision-making in the indigenous context, over and above the usual right to 
political participation.  The article argues that self-determination under 
UNDRIP is equivalent in scope to “traditional” self-determination.  It is 
unacceptable and unnecessary to restrict it to a lesser form of self-
determination than that recognized for “all peoples” under established 
international law.  Ultimately, the article argues that the right of self-
determination can be defined as a people’s right to control its own affairs 
through freedom from discrimination and meaningful participation in 
decision-making.   
Having articulated self-determination in this manner, the purpose of 
Section III is to use those two fundamental components–non-discrimination 
and participation–as the benchmark for assessing Australia’s approach in 
NTER against established and evolving international standards.  In doing so, 
the article aims to set NTER within the framework of the wider international 
human rights context, and to demonstrate why the Stronger Futures 
legislation package and other initiatives must be implemented in alignment 
with that context if they are to succeed.   
Section III starts by introducing the Intervention and outlining the two 
major themes of criticism that form the parameters of discussion, concluding 
that the approach taken by the Australian government in NTER lacked both 
of the normative foundations for self-determination set out in section II.  It 
then builds on this argument by examining each of those international legal 
foundations in more detail, and applying them to the domestic NTER 
context.  First, the article looks at the right to non-discrimination, including 
the role of special measures, and then it discusses the right to participation in 
decision-making, elaborating on the important point that UNDRIP 
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transcends established participatory rights.  Judged against the criteria of 
self-determination based on non-discrimination and participation in 
decision-making, NTER assessment shows that in its choice of methods 
Australia failed to live up to contemporary international standards of 
engagement with its indigenous peoples, and was out of step with the 
messages of empowerment and respect embodied in UNDRIP.   
Section IV provides a preliminary assessment of the Stronger Futures 
initiative against the same criteria, to see whether Australia has taken the 
criticism of its NTER methodology on board.  The end of the NTER period 
provided an opportunity for a fresh start and a renewed commitment to 
fostering genuine engagement.  Early indications about the Stronger Futures 
consultations gave some cause for cautious optimism about an improved 
approach, but there is also troubling evidence suggesting little has changed.  
While it is perhaps too early to be categorical in evaluating the methodology 
used in the development and implementation of the new legislation, the 
importance of not repeating the mistakes of NTER cannot be overstated.  
Finally, Section V concludes by drawing together all of the strands of my 
argument argument. 
Before proceeding, it is worth pausing to clearly define the limits of 
discussion.  First, the author acknowledges that converting aspirations to 
reality is easier said than done.  This contribution is presented from an 
academic international legal perspective, not from a practical domestic 
policy perspective, and the emphases and observations will naturally reflect 
that position.  In particular, the article does not address the wider debates in 
Australia or elsewhere about improving state-indigenous relations, or 
attempt to provide all the answers to implementation of UNDRIP.  
Nonetheless, it is hoped that critical scholarship and the articulation of a 
simple working definition of self-determination based squarely on 
established rights can make some contribution towards those goals.  
Second, the application of international human rights criteria to assess 
NTER is limited to the methods employed once Australia decided to act.  
The author does not deny the very real need for action as a matter of 
international human rights law, and does not privilege concerns about 
process over the violations of other substantive rights that NTER purported 
to address.  The argument is that once Australia had decided to take action, it 
should have maximized the opportunity for real change by doing things 
properly, in line with established and evolving standards.  Instead, there is 
254 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 22 NO. 2 
 
evidence that the discriminatory and paternalistic approach taken was a large 
factor in undermining NTER’s own effectiveness.24   
Third, the article generally does not engage with the substance and 
detail of the domestic legislation, except where it illuminates an argument 
about Australia’s overall methodology and approach.  This is partly because 
the 500-page suite of NTER legislation (now replaced and supplemented by 
some 300 pages of Stronger Futures legislation) is simply too 
comprehensive in scope to cover each of the detailed reforms in any useful 
way here.  Primarily, however, it is because the focus is on evaluating the 
methodology, from an international human rights perspective, rather than 
assessing the ins and outs of individual policies and whether or not each one 
might be effective.  No doubt there have been provisions among the overall 
package that do make welcome changes and have the support of Aboriginal 
people in NT, but again, it cannot be argued that any such positive effects 
have come about because Australia proceeded the way it did, or that a 
discriminatory approach was necessary for those benefits to be realized.   
II. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION  
A. Self-Determination is the River in which All Other Rights Swim25 
 
The adoption of UNDRIP by the GA in 2007 was described as a 
“beacon of hope” for indigenous peoples around the world.26  Before 2007, 
only two international legal instruments contained any specific recognition 
of indigenous rights–International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions 
10727 and 16928–and both demonstrate a markedly top-down, state-focused 
perspective.29  UNDRIP represents a significaSnt change of approach.  It 
                                                      
24  National Territory Emergency Response (“NTER”) Review Board, REPORT OF THE NTER REVIEW 
BOARD (Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://www.nterreview.gov.au/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) [hereinafter 
REVIEW BOARD REPORT]. 
25  Craig Scott, Indigenous Self-Determination and Decolonization of the International Imagination: 
A Plea, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 814, 814 (1996) (quoting Michael Dodson).  
26  Russel Barsh, Indigenous Peoples and the UN Commission on Human Rights: A Case of the 
Immovable Object and the Irresistible Force, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 782, 808 (1996) (quoting Erica-Irene Daes). 
27  Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention 1957 (entered into force June 2, 1959). 
28  Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991). 
29  For detailed discussion, see ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS 
STANDARDS: SELF-DETERMINATION, CULTURE AND LAND 49-101 (2007); Andrew Erueti, The International 
Labour Organization and the Internationalisation of the Concept of Indigenous Peoples, in Allen & 
Xanthaki eds., supra note 12, at 93-120.  Convention 107 in particular was notoriously assimilationist.  It 
has largely been superseded by Convention 169, which was undoubtedly an improvement and has had 
some impact beyond its limited membership (just 22 parties as of July 8, 2012), but it still retains a 
decidedly state-driven flavor and does not enjoy widespread support from indigenous representatives.  See 
Tennant, supra note 10; Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Paper Presented at the Indigenous Peoples' Summit: The 
Challenges of Implementing the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2008), available at 
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does not create wholly new rights that do not exist in other instruments, but 
pulls together pre-existing rights of general and specific application and 
spells out how they relate to the specific conditions of indigenous peoples.30  
As such, new applications of existing rights will emerge.  It goes beyond 
simply a synthesis of current practice,31 adding new nuances and advancing 
indigenous rights with the inclusion of collective rights as well as individual 
ones.32  Above all, UNDRIP treads new ground with its strong themes of 
empowerment and partnership, departing from the traditional state-driven 
approaches seen in the ILO Conventions.   
Undoubtedly, UNDRIP’s most significant contribution to international 
law is the unequivocal recognition in article 3 that indigenous peoples have 
the right to self-determination.33  The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
has described self-determination as the “need to pay regard to the freely 
expressed will of peoples,” 34  but for decades there has been enormous 
controversy over the meaning of “peoples.”35  The language of UNDRIP 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.tebtebba.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=16&Itemid=27 (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2011).    
30  Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Making the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Work: The 
Challenge Ahead, in Allen & Xanthaki (eds.), supra note 12, at 147-70; Special Rapporteur, S. James 
Anaya, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/9/ (Aug. 11, 2008) 
[hereinafter “Anaya Report 2008”].  For discussion about the need for a special regime for indigenous 
rights, beyond universal or minority rights, see, e.g., Xanthaki, supra note 29, at 133; Richard Falk, The 
Rights of Peoples, in Brownlie, supra note 1, at 17-37; Cassidy, supra note 2; E. Cobb, Fifty Thousand 
Years Old and Still Fighting For Rights: The Continuing Struggle of Australia's Indigenous Population, 38 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 375 (2010); Tauli-Corpuz, supra note 29; Mauro Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in 
the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 957 (2009).  For the contrary view, see, e.g., Jeff Corntassel & Tomas 
Primeau Hopkins, Indigenous ‘Sovereignty’ and International Law: Revised Strategies for Pursuing ‘Self-
Determination’, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 343 (1995).  
31  Barsh, supra note 26, at 808 (quoting Daes); Helen Quane, The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: New Directions for Self-Determination and Participatory Rights?, in REFLECTIONS ON 
THE UNDRIP, supra note 12, at 259-88. 
32  XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 107-09; Barelli, supra note 30, at 963; Cindy Holder & Jeff 
Corntassel, Indigenous Peoples and Multicultural Citizenship: Bridging Collective and Individual Rights, 
24 HUM. RTS. Q. 126 (2002). 
33  Indigenous peoples’ strong desire for recognition of their right to self-determination was both the 
driving force behind the development of UNDRIP and the most controversial aspect of debate.  See Lâm, 
supra note 8, at 608; Erica-Irene Daes, An Overview of the History of Indigenous Peoples: Self-
Determination and the United Nations, 21 CAMBRIDGE REV. OF INT’L AFF. 7, 14 (2008); Eide, supra note 
4; Xanthaki, supra note 29, at 110-12; Stavenhagen, supra note 4; S. James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, 
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment, JURIST LEGAL NEWS 
AND RESEARCH–FORUM, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-of-
indigenous.php, (last visited Oct. 12, 2011). 
34  Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, para. 59 (Oct. 16) [hereineafter Western 
Sahara].  
35  See generally S. James Anaya, Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-
Determination, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (1993) [hereinafter Anaya (1993)]; ROSALYN 
HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT, 121-28 (1994); Wiessner, 
supra note 4; S. James Anaya, Self-Determination as a Collective Human Right Under Contemporary 
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expressly confirms for the first time that indigenous peoples are included 
within the meaning of “all peoples” that are entitled to self-determination 
under international law.  
The purpose of this section is not to undertake a comprehensive 
review of the right to self-determination under international law; nor of the 
rights of indigenous peoples or minorities generally; nor of the unusual 
development of UNDRIP itself.  Each of these topics has been discussed 
extensively in the literature.36  The objective here is to focus on the meaning 
of self-determination now that UNDRIP has been adopted, drawing on 
competing formulations and historical areas of contention and consensus 
where they are useful.  The aim is to offer a simple articulation of the right 
to self-determination, derived from an examination of the background, 
content, and context of UNDRIP.  The simplicity of the definition advanced 
is not intended to mask the complexity of this area of law, but to translate 
self-determination into a form that is less abstract and less controversial, and 
thus facilitates its practical implementation.   
To provide some background to the indigenous self-determination 
debate, the next section outlines briefly the competing understandings of 
self-determination during UNDRIP’s drafting process. 
A. Competing Understandings of Self-Determination 
For indigenous peoples, self-determination is the “mother of all 
rights.” 37   It is seen as a necessary foundation for indigenous peoples’ 
enjoyment of all the other rights they claim,38 and the only solution to their 
                                                                                                                                                              
International Law, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION 3-
18 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000) [hereinafter Anaya (2000)]; Kristian Myntti, The Right of 
Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination and Effective Participation, in Aikio & Scheinin (eds.) at 85-130.   
36  See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 1; MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Christian Tomuschat 
ed., 1993); Tennant, supra note 10; ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL 
REAPPRAISAL (1995); Julian Burger, The United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 209 (1996); Aikio & Scheinin (eds.), supra note 35; KNOP, supra note 8; 
PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2002); S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2004); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 108-28 (2d ed. 2006); Eide, supra note 4; XANTHAKI, supra note 29; UNIVERSAL 
MINORITY RIGHTS (Marc Weller ed., 2007); Wiessner, supra notes 4; Weissner, supra note 5; Daes, supra 
note 33; ILA REPORT, supra note 3, at 834-923. 
37  S. James Anaya, Superpower Attitudes Towards Indigenous Peoples and Group Rights, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 251, 257 (1999)  
38  Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
People, The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Australia, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/37/Add.4, para. 54 (Mar. 4, 
2010) (by S. James Anaya) [hereinafter Anaya Report 2010]; HRC Res., General Comment No 12: Article 
1 (The right to self- determination of peoples), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, 134 (1984); Lubicon Lake 
Band v. Canada, HRC, U.N. Doc A/42/40, para. 13.3 (March 26, 1984); Special Rapporteur of the Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study on the Problem of 
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations: Final Report, Part III, U.N. Doc. 
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problems:39  for them, self-determination is the pillar on which UNDRIP 
rests.40  Of course, the interests of indigenous peoples around the world are 
not identical, and specific demands will be diverse, but generally there has 
been remarkable consensus.41  The words most frequently used to translate 
self-determination into indigenous languages reflect concepts of freedom, 
integrity and respect. 42   In essence, the many aspirations and desires 
expressed by indigenous peoples under the umbrella of self-determination43 
can be summarized as “the right to be in control of their own destinies under 
conditions of equality.”44 
The persistent claims by indigenous peoples, framed in the language 
of self-determination, have been met with sustained opposition from states.45  
Traditionally, states have recognized self-determination as the right of 
peoples under colonial, foreign, or alien occupation to independence.46  Self-
determination has typically been seen as a right of whole populations, rather 
than a right of subgroups within a state.47  The “specter of secession” looms 
large: states fear that recognizing indigenous self-determination will 
                                                                                                                                                              
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8 para. 269 (Sept. 30, 1983) (by José Martínez-Cobo) [hereinafter Martínez-
Cobo Report 1983]. 
39  Marjo Lindroth, Indigenous-State Relations in the UN: Establishing the Indigenous Forum, 42 
POLAR RECORD 239, 244 (2006). 
40  Catherine Brölmann & Marjoleine Zieck, Some Remarks on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, 8 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 103, 104 (1995); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/30, para. 27 (Aug. 17, 1994). 
41  Grose, supra note 2, at 72. 
42  Erica-Irene Daes, The Spirit and Letter of the Right to Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples: 
Reflections on the Making of the United Nations Draft Declaration, in Aikio & Scheinin (eds.), supra note 
35, at 67-83, 79. 
43  See, e.g., Lindroth, supra note 39, at 244; Daes, supra note 33, at 17; ILA Report, supra note 3, at 
846-50; Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 33. 
44  Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n. H.R., Report No. 75/02, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 5 rev. 1, para. 64 (2002); Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. 
Belize, Case 12.053, INTER-AM. COMM’N. H.R., REPORT NO. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. para. 
55 (2004). 
45  For discussion of the major objections, see Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination and Indigenous 
Peoples, in Aikio & Scheinin (eds.), supra note 35, at 39-64, 47-57. 
46  See, e.g., Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 
1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR (Dec. 14, 1960) [hereinafter Colonial Declaration]; Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 
(Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration]; Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 50/6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/6 (Nov. 9, 1995); Universal 
Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, G.A. Res. 58/161, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58.161 
(March 2, 2004).  See also Namibia, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21, 1971); Western Sahara, 
supra note 34; Cassese, supra note 36; THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 36, 
at 108-28. 
47  See THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 36; Cassese, supra note 36, at 
334-35; HIGGINS, supra note 35; compare Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, para. 124 
(Can.).  
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undermine their sovereignty and territorial integrity, leading to 
fragmentation of the world order through the formation of new micro-
states.48 
In traditional conceptions of self-determination, a distinction is often 
made between so-called “internal” and “external” self-determination. 49  
Internal self-determination, according to Daes, is “best viewed as entitling a 
people to choose their political allegiances, to influence the political order in 
which they live, and to preserve their cultural, ethnic, historical or territorial 
identity.”50  Broadly speaking, this encompasses the majority of indigenous 
claims to self-determination.  External self-determination, by contrast, is 
“the act by which a people determines its future international status and 
liberates itself from ‘alien’ rules.”51  Many authors and states equate external 
self-determination with the creation of an independent state.52 
Given the semantic blockage that has resulted from different 
interpretations of self-determination,53 some commentators have argued that 
indigenous claims fall outside the meaning of self-determination in 
international law.54  They argue that what indigenous peoples actually seek is 
something different,55 and that they would do better to rely on other, more 
relevant language in pursuing their cause.56  Others argue that indigenous 
claims are not served by Western notions at all.57   
These arguments ignore not only the immense political significance 
that indigenous peoples attach (for better or worse) to their pursuit of self-
determination, 58  but also the evolving nature of international legal 
                                                      
48  Wiessner, supra note 4, at 116.  See General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration Press Release].  
49  See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 36, at 67-140; Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, General Recommendation No. XXI on the Right to Self-Determination, U.N. Doc. A/51/18 
(1996); Myntti, supra note 35, at 103-09; Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47, at para. 126.  
50  Erica-Irene Daes, Explanatory Note Concerning the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26/Add. 1 (1993), para 19.  
51  Id. at para 17. 
52  See XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 146, 152; Anaya, supra note 37, at 258; Higgins, supra note 35, 
at 124. 
53  David Makinson, Rights of Peoples: A Logician's Point of View, in Brownlie, supra note 1, at 69-
92, 757.  
54  See, e.g., Corntassel & Hopkins, supra note 30. 
55  See, e.g., Falk, supra note 30. 
56  See, e.g., Corntassel & Hopkins, supra note 30; Kyla Reid, Against the Right to Self-
Determination (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1905257, (last visited Oct. 13, 2011) (Working 
Paper). 
57  Gary Johns, The Poverty of Self-Determination, in WAKING UP TO DREAMTIME: THE ILLUSION OF 
ABORIGINAL SELF-DETERMINATION  15-34; Trevor Satour, The New Authoritarian Separatism, in WAKING 
UP TO DREAMTIME: THE ILLUSION OF ABORIGINAL SELF-DETERMINATION 35-57 (G. Johns ed., 2007); Otto, 
supra note 2.  
58  Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 33. 
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concepts,59 and the importance of equality.60  The better view is that the 
widespread fear among states of indigenous secession is unreasonable and 
overstated.61  It should not prevent development of all peoples’ recognized 
right to self-determination,62 now that its existence for indigenous peoples is 
beyond doubt.  This argument is based on a consideration of UNDRIP itself 
within the context of established international law.   
B. The Meaning of Self-Determination Under UNDRIP 
Self-determination is not defined in UNDRIP.  In summary, this 
Section argues that the content of self-determination under UNDRIP can be 
distilled to two essential prerequisites:  meaningful participation in decision-
making, and freedom from discrimination.  These foundations are tied 
together by the overriding element of empowerment that permeates the text, 
to give a definition of self-determination that amounts to the right of 
indigenous peoples to control their own affairs.  As such, self-determination 
under UNDRIP reflects pre-existing human rights, but it adds an extra 
element of normative content that has previously been lacking for 
indigenous peoples.  It is not a completely new right63 or even a radical re-
interpretation of self-determination as traditionally understood, 64  but a 
natural evolution that is consistent with existing international law. 65  
Interpreted this way, it becomes clear that self-determination must not be 
treated as synonymous with secession in all cases, and that the scope of self-
determination in the indigenous context must be read as equal to its scope 
for all other peoples.  The next Sections address, in turn, the content and 
scope of the right to self-determination under UNDRIP.  
1.  Content of the Right to Self-Determination Under UNDRIP 
The right to self-determination in Article 3 of UNDRIP is framed 
almost identically to common Article 1 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) and the International 
                                                      
59  See XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 149-51; HIGGINS, supra note 35; Benedict Kingsbury, 
Reconstructing Self-Determination: A Relational Approach, in Aikio & Scheinin (eds.), supra note 35, at 
19-37.   
60  Otto, supra note 2, at 92; Barsh, supra note 26; XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 131-32.  
61  Anaya, supra note 37; Scott, supra note 25.  This worry on the part of states has been described as 
“something of a red herring” by Julian Burger, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
From Advocacy to Implementation, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UNDRIP, supra note 12, at 41-59, 45. 
62  See generally Cassese, supra note 36, at 348-51. 
63  Compare statements by Ecuador and the UK cited in Quane, supra note 31 (Ecuador and UK 
claim this is an entirely new right).  
64  Makinson, supra note 53, at 75. 
65  ANAYA REPORT 2008, supra note 30; XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 131-76; Barelli, supra note 30. 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which in turn came from 
General Resolution 1541 (XV) of 1960, the “Colonial Declaration:” 
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination.  By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.66  
Article 4 of UNDRIP goes on to provide that: 
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government 
in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as 
ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.  
It is explicit in these provisions that the right to self-determination entails an 
element of political freedom, as well as the free pursuit of economic, social, 
and cultural development, and that its exercise may be closely linked to 
autonomy or self-government.  
Before analyzing what is included within the meaning of self-
determination, it is important to set the parameters of what must be left out.  
During the drafting process there was a tendency for indigenous 
representatives to treat self-determination as an expansive catch-all right,67 
and some saw all of UNDRIP’s provisions as part of self-determination.68  
Many indigenous claimants see their rights to lands and natural resources, 
and respect for cultural integrity, as integral aspects of self-determination.69  
There is no denying that the exercise of self-determination may be 
linked to these other important rights, 70  but subsuming them into the 
definition of self-determination itself is not the answer.  Expanding the 
meaning of self-determination to cover everything dilutes its power,71 while 
                                                      
66  In the ICCPR, ICESCR, and the Colonial Declaration, “indigenous” is replaced by “all”. 
67  XANTHAKI, supra note 29. 
68  Foster, supra note 11, at 150. 
69  See, e.g., Dann v. United States, supra note 44; John Henriksen, The Right of Self-Determination: 
Indigenous Peoples versus States, in Aikio & Scheinin (eds.), supra note 35, at 131-41, 136; Ted Moses, 
The Right of Self-Determination and its Significance to the Survival of Indigenous Peoples, in Aikio & 
Scheinin (eds.), supra note 35, at 155-177, 162; Quane, supra note 31, at 262. 
70  ICCPR Common Article 1(2); ICESCR common art. 1(2); UNDRIP, art. 3; Mahuika et al. v. New 
Zealand, HRC, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993, para. 9.2 (Nov. 16, 2000); Lubicon Lake Band v. 
Canada, supra note 38 at para. 13.4; Human Rights Council, General Comment No. 12, supra note 38; 
Diergaardt v Namibia, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/760/1996 (2000), para. 10.3; 
Daes, supra note 33, at 8; United Nations Permanent Forum on Indegnous Issues (“NPFII”), State of the 
World’s Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/328 16 (2009); Alison Vivian, Some Human Rights Are 
Worth More Than Others: The Northern Territory Intervention and the Alice Springs Town Camps, 35 ALT. 
L.J. 13 (2010).   
71  Corntassel & Hopkins, supra note 30, at 361; XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 152. 
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simultaneously draining power from other rights that are separately 
recognized as worthy of protection in themselves.72  While it may be that the 
principle of self-determination is capable of encapsulating all these 
aspirations, the right as it has been recognized in UNDRIP will necessarily 
be more tightly confined.73   
Alexandra Xanthaki advocates striking a balance between a 
maximalist approach to self-determination, which sees it as “all things to all 
men,”74 and a minimalist one, which prevents its development beyond the 
contexts in which it has traditionally been recognized.75  She suggests that 
cultural and socio-economic rights should be considered separately from 
self-determination. 76   This view is shared by Higgins 77  and the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee (“HRC”).78   
Besides cultural and socio-economic rights, there has also been 
extensive discussion about autonomy and self-government in the context of 
indigenous self-determination.79  Some commentators have argued that they 
are essential components of the right,80 or even that the indigenous goal of 
self-determination is autonomy and self-government.81   
However, the President of the ICJ, in his concurring declaration in the 
Namibia case, made the point that being restricted to internal autonomy and 
local self-government is effectively a denial of self-determination as it is 
envisaged in the Charter.82  In other words, autonomy and self-government 
do not amount to self-determination.  Nor are they simply component parts 
of self-determination: the structure of Articles 3 and 4 reveals that autonomy 
and self-government are separate rights in and of themselves, which may be 
                                                      
72  XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 154. 
73  Self-determination exists as political principle, legal principle, and legal right. See, e.g., Crawford, 
supra note 36, at 108-28; XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 143, 155-57; KNOP, supra note 8, at 29-49.  The 
shift from “principle” to “right” first appeared in 1960. Colonial Declaration, supra note 46.  See HIGGINS, 
supra note 35, at 114. 
74  HIGGINS, supra note 35, at 128. 
75  XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 146-54. 
76  Id. at 154. 
77  HIGGINS, supra note 35, at 125. 
78  See Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), General Comment No. 23: Article 27 (The rights of 
minorities), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, 158 (May 12, 1994) (distinguishing Articles 1 and 27 of the 
ICCPR, although it should be noted that the HRC acknowledged in Mahuika v. New Zealand, supra note 
70, that Article 1 helps inform article 27.)   
79  See, e.g., ILA Report, supra note 3, at 850-57; Foster, supra note 11; Benedict Kingsbury, Claims 
By Non-State Groups, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 481, 487 (1992); Kingsbury, supra note 59, at 26-31; 
Henriksen, supra note 69; Myntti, supra note 35, at 114-122; Stefania Errico, The Draft UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Overview, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 741-55 (2007). 
80  Tennant, supra note 10. 
81  Federico Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of 
Indigenous Peoples, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 155, 173 (2007).   
82  Namibia, supra note 46, para. 63 (President Zafrulla Khan).  
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possible expressions of the indigenous right to self-determination. 83  
Similarly, under Article 3, the free determination of political status and free 
pursuit of development are consequences of having the right to self-
determination, rather than components of the right itself.  
The key to defining self-determination is not to incorporate the 
specific substantive content of all other rights related to its exercise, but to 
distil the overarching right to its normative essence.  It needs to be expressed 
in a form that is flexible enough to encompass and facilitate the exercise of 
those other rights, without diminishing their power as separate rights 
existing in and of themselves, and without becoming so general as to be 
meaningless.   
The essence of self-determination in UNDRIP is the thread of 
empowerment running through Articles 3 and 4: the “power to have 
power;”84 the freedom to choose.  This focus is consistent with the emphasis 
on the peoples’ free choice as a foundation of self-determination as it has 
traditionally been understood.85  
Practically speaking, this empowerment in UNDRIP translates to an 
enhanced freedom to participate in decision-making.  UNDRIP emphasizes 
the need for political participation, and the importance of indigenous 
peoples’ freedom to choose what form their political participation will 
take. 86   Indigenous peoples can participate in the same systems and 
institutions as the rest of their state, or use their own institutions, or combine 
the two options.  That right to choose is a vital expression of empowerment 
in itself.  Under traditional international law, political participation as a 
prerequisite for self-determination is reflected in the concept of 
representative government upheld in General Resolution 2625 of 1970, the 
Friendly Relations Declaration.87   
A significant development throughout UNDRIP, however, is the 
widespread use of related terms including “free, prior and informed 
consent,”  “consultation and cooperation,”  “partnership” and “active 
involvement.” 88   This pattern extends participation beyond the political 
sphere, providing for close involvement in decision-making across all areas 
                                                      
83  Autonomy and self-government have not previously been recognized as distinct rights in 
international law, although elements of these concepts feature in ILO Convention 169 without express 
reference to self-determination.  See Kingsbury, supra note 59, at 26; Myntti, supra note 35, at 114-22; 
Errico, supra note 79, at 749-50. 
84  Otto, supra note 2, at 75. 
85  Western Sahara, supra note 34; HIGGINS, supra note 35; Cassese, supra note 36, 334. 
86  See UNIDRIP arts. 5, 18 and 19. 
87  See infra, text accompanying note 109. 
88  See, e.g., UNDRIP, preamble, para. 15, 19, 24; Id. arts. 5, 10-12, 15, 17-19, 22, 23, 25, 27-30, 32, 
36, 38, 41. 
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of engagement between states and indigenous peoples.  This extra 
dimension, described as “genuinely groundbreaking,”89 provides the added 
level of empowerment that will facilitate the free pursuit of development 
contemplated in article 3.  The significance of the enhanced participatory 
rights is illustrated further below, when it comes to assessing NTER against 
the standards of self-determination in UNDRIP.  
Also integral to the interpretation of UNDRIP are the prominent 
themes of equality and non-discrimination woven through the text. 90  
Articles 1, 2, and 9 are particularly important in this regard, emphasizing 
that indigenous peoples, collectively and as individuals, have the right to full 
enjoyment of all human rights, free from discrimination of any kind. 91  
Discrimination against indigenous peoples would undermine UNDRIP 
altogether; the rest of the rights it contains, including self-determination and 
participation, can have little meaning while discrimination persists.  The 
earlier emphasis on non-discrimination through assimilation into the 
dominant culture, for which ILO Convention 107 was strongly criticized,92 
has shifted to a recognition of equality that respects the value of diversity 
and difference and underpins the enjoyment of all other rights in UNDRIP. 
Participation in decision-making and freedom from discrimination are 
essential prerequisites for indigenous empowerment; together, these 
ingredients form the content of self-determination under UNDRIP.  The 
practical application of the right, thus defined, can be tailored to fit the 
specific circumstances of different indigenous peoples around the world.  
This interpretation is consistent with the views of various states expressed 
during the drafting process, including Australia.93  
                                                      
89  Quane, supra note 31, at 273. 
90  See, e.g., UNDRIP preamble arts. 2, 4, 5, 9, 18, 22, arts. 1, 2, 9, 14-17, 21, 22, 24, 29, 44, 46. 
91  UNDRIP art. 1 provides:  
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law.”  
Art. 2 provides: “Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other 
peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in 
the exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity.   
 
Art. 9 provides: “Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous 
community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation 
concerned.  No discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right.” 
 
92  See XANTHAKI, supra note 29, 49-101; Erueti, supra note 29, at 93-120; Tauli-Corpuz, supra, note 
29; Tennant, supra note 10; see also Falk, supra note 30, at 32-33; Barelli, supra note 30, at 958.   
93  See Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Open-Ended Intersessional 
Working Group on a Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2/Add.2 para. 8 (Nov. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Working Group Draft Declaration].   
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2. Scope of the Right to Self-Determination under UNDRIP 
On the whole, the rights contained in UNDRIP are generally described 
as means of exercising internal self-determination.94  What is not explicitly 
resolved in UNDRIP is the burning question of whether it also recognizes 
external self-determination.  Article 46(1) provides that UNDRIP does not 
imply a right to contravene the UN Charter, or authorize or encourage any 
action that would “dismember or impair . . . the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign and independent States.95  Certain commentators 
argue that the inclusion of this provision at a very late stage of negotiations 
implicitly ruled out any possibility of indigenous secession.96  Several states, 
including Australia, seem to share this view.97   
This argument merits close scrutiny.  According to Daes, states 
intended that UNDRIP would only allow for internal elements of the right.98  
But reading Article 46(1) as categorically excluding the possibility of 
external self-determination inevitably leads to the conclusion that the right to 
self-determination is different in scope for indigenous peoples, as compared 
to all other peoples.  The intention of states during drafting may be one 
consideration to take into account, but UNDRIP now stands as an adopted 
text and it is open to alternative interpretations.  Let it be clear that the 
author expresses no opinion on the merits or otherwise of indigenous 
secession as such; rather, the argument to follow pursues an important point 
about equality–one of the cornerstones of UNDRIP.  The scope of self-
determination for indigenous peoples under UNDRIP must equal the scope 
of the right for all peoples.  Closer analysis of the text itself and of the 
international legal context reveals why the conclusion that UNDRIP 
categorically excludes indigenous secession is not only unacceptable, but 
also unnecessary. 
                                                      
94  See e.g., Eide, supra note 4; Daes, supra note 33. 
95  The full text of UNDRIP art. 46(1) reads:  
 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group 
or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter 
of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States. 
 
96  See, e.g., Eide, supra note 4, at 211; Quane, supra note 31; Engle, supra note 12. 
97  Jenny Macklin MP, Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 
(FAHCSIA), Statement on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Apr. 3, 
2009), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/Australia_official_statement_endorsem
ent_UNDRIP.pdf; Declaration Press Release, supra note 48. 
98  Daes, supra note 33; see also Foster, supra note 11, at 152-53. 
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There are no established rules for the interpretation of GA 
resolutions,99 but by analogy, the customary rules of treaty interpretation 
enshrined in Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
may provide useful guidance.100  The basic rule is that a text should be 
interpreted in good faith according to the ordinary meaning of its terms in 
their context, in light of the instrument’s object and purpose.101  Recourse to 
supplementary means of interpretation such as the travaux préparatoires is 
generally only indicated if it is necessary to confirm the meaning resulting 
from the basic rule, or to determine the meaning if the application of that 
basic rule leads to an interpretation which is ambiguous or obscure, or 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.102 
If UNDRIP is to be applied in good faith, then it is imperative that any 
interpretation of UNDRIP treat the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination as equal to the right afforded to “all peoples.”103  Looking at 
the ordinary meaning of the language used, none of the provisions in 
UNDRIP expressly exclude external self-determination, in any form.  Article 
3 merely refers to “self-determination” in unqualified form, using identical 
language to common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR.  Article 46(1) 
contains no explicit reference to self-determination nor to Article 3, but 
simply echoes the long-established position on self-determination under 
general international law.104   
As for the context, the view that self-determination in UNDRIP is the 
same as that recognized for “all peoples” is supported by Article 46(2), 
which provides that any limitations on the rights in UNDRIP are to be non-
discriminatory, and preambular paragraph 16, which affirms the fundamental 
importance of the right of all peoples to self-determination under the major 
international instruments.  Further, preambular paragraph 17 states “nothing 
in UNDRIP may be used to deny any peoples their right to self-
                                                      
99  But see generally C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 61-65 (2d ed. 2005); CARLOS FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANI, SOVEREIGNTY AND 
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS (2007). 
100 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].  
For a discussion of the interpretation of Security Council resolutions which likewise uses the treaty 
interpretation principles as a starting point, and addresses the limitations of such an approach, see Michael 
Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 73 
(1998).   
101  VCLT, supra note 100, at art. 31. 
102  VCLT, supra note 100, at art. 32. 
103  ILA REPORT, supra note 3, 850; Daes, supra note 50, para. 28; Lâm, supra note 8; Kingsbury, 
supra note 59, at 22-23; Otto, supra note 2. 
104  E.g. Colonial Declaration, supra note 46; Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 46.  The 
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation Europe (Aug. 1, 1975) 14 ILM 1292 [hereinafter 
Helsinki Final Act]; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (June 25, 
1993).  See Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47 at para. 130. 
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determination exercised in conformity with international law.”  This is also 
an indication of UNDRIP’s object and purpose.   
Although states might argue that the object and purpose of inserting 
Article 46(1) was to exclude any possibility of indigenous secession as a 
means of self-determination, there is a counter-argument that such an 
interpretation violates the fundamental principle of good faith,105 besides 
contradicting the ordinary meaning of the words on their face.  It cannot be 
correct that the very instrument that recognizes indigenous peoples’ right to 
self-determination simultaneously denies it, by removing the peoples’ right 
to choose and restricting it to purely internal means of self-determination.106  
To read the same words as meaning something less in the case of indigenous 
peoples than they mean for all other peoples, without an express exclusion in 
the text, undermines the spirit of equality and non-discrimination that is the 
backbone of the text and one of the most important objects of the 
declaration.  Rather, UNDRIP must be read as granting indigenous peoples 
access to the same rights and remedies available to “all peoples”–subject, of 
course, to the same legal limitations that apply to all peoples.   
This crucial qualifier leads into the argument that a restrictive reading 
of UNDRIP is unnecessary.  International instruments must be interpreted 
and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the 
time of interpretation,107 particularly jus cogens.  The international law of 
self-determination outside the indigenous context has developed in such a 
way that it is clear the right operates subject to the overriding protection 
granted to the territorial integrity of “parent” states. 108   The Friendly 
Relations Declaration protects the territorial integrity and political unity of:  
sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples and thus possessed of a government 
                                                      
105  Admittedly, UNDRIP is not a treaty and indigenous peoples are not “parties” to it in any sense, 
but nonetheless, the ICJ has held that the customary law principle of good faith is “[o]ne of the basic 
principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source”. Nuclear 
Tests (Australia v. France) 1974 I.C.J. 268, para. 46 (Dec. 20) and Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) 
1974 I.C.J. 473, para. 49 (Dec. 20).  Perhaps states are not yet under a strict obligation to recognize 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, but it seems likely that the customary status of that right 
will develop over time, in line with the customary obligation on states to protect “all peoples” right to self-
determination. 
106  See supra, text accompanying note 82.  
107  Namibia, supra note 46, at para. 53.  
108  See Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47, at para. 131; Barsh, supra note 26; Lars-
Anders Baer, The Right of Self-Determination and the Case of the Sami, in Aikio & Scheinin (eds.), supra 
note 35, 223-231, 230. 
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representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour.109  
There is no reason why this protection would not cover self-
determination by indigenous peoples.  Simply having the status of a 
“people” does not automatically entail a general right to unilateral secession 
under international law.110  There are only limited cases where the exercise 
of self-determination through secession is undisputedly legitimate: where a 
people seek independence from colonial, foreign or alien domination.111   
In all other cases, state boundaries are protected, provided the state 
possesses a representative government–that is, one whose policies “reflect 
the nature and interests of both the population of the state as a whole and of 
the peoples who are part of the population”. 112   Thus, representative 
government requires avenues for participation in decision-making without 
discrimination.  The wording of the Friendly Relations Declaration 
encapsulates the same relationship between participation and equality that 
was identified above as providing the foundation for self-determination 
under UNDRIP.   
In other words, self-determination under UNDRIP derives from and is 
consistent with existing law on self-determination.  That does not mean the 
right of self-determination is exactly identical in nature for all peoples in all 
cases–self-determination manifests in different forms, depending on the 
circumstances113–but it supports the argument that all peoples are entitled to 
equivalent recognition of the right.114  
Another important consideration is that self-determination is not a 
static right, but a continual process.115  If the meaningful exercise of internal 
self-determination becomes impossible because the state is breaching 
fundamental rights and is not truly representative, there is some suggestion 
that in exceptional circumstances a limited option of remedial secession 
might arise, as a last resort when all other means of peaceful remedy have 
                                                      
109  In the Vienna Declaration the words “as to race, creed or colour” were replaced by “of any kind.” 
110  See Daes, supra note 33, at 7. 
111  See, e.g., Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47, at para. 131; Cassese, supra note 36, at 
334; Colonial Declaration, supra note 46; Namibia, supra note 46; Friendly Relations Declaration, supra 
note 46.  
112  Foster, supra note 11, at 143; compare HIGGINS, supra note 35, at 124.  See also Myntti, supra 
note 35, at 97. 
113  See Frederic Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 304 (1994); Brownlie, supra note 1; Kingsbury, supra note 79, at 498. 
114  If the right for indigenous peoples is different, it must only be more favorable, not less, in 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ particular disadvantage.  ILA REPORT, supra note 3, at 850.  See also 
Graham & Wiessner, supra note 12, at 413-14. 
115  See Helsinki Final Act, supra note 104; HIGGINS, supra note 35, at 115, 119; Kingsbury, supra 
note 59; Thornberry, supra note 45, at 51; Daes, supra note 42, at 79; XANTHAKI, supra note 29. 
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failed.116  The argument for remedial secession is based on the notion that 
without truly representative government, the right to self-determination is 
frustrated in just the same manner as it is under colonial or alien domination, 
the traditional grounds for exercising self-determination.117 
Looking at this argument from a different angle, Anaya advocates a 
conceptual shift away from the usual division between internal and external 
self-determination, to focus instead on substance and remedy.118  On this 
view, substantive self-determination comprises those elements that are 
reflected in UNDRIP and generally accepted as expressions of internal self-
determination.119  Only when the government fails to make the ongoing 
exercise of self-determination possible within the state does the question of a 
remedy for the violation of the norm arise.  Secession is just one example of 
a remedy;120 the choice of remedy will be influenced by the context of the 
violation.  In this regard, substantive self-determination applies broadly to 
benefit all segments of humanity, but remedial self-determination is 
necessarily narrower in application.121   
Anaya’s distinction is persuasive and illuminating.  On this 
understanding, the entrenched assumption that self-determination means 
secession and is wedded to entitlements or attributes of statehood is exposed 
as unnecessary, confusing remedy with substance.122  The professed fear of 
states is disproportionate to the actual threat to their sovereignty.  No people, 
indigenous or otherwise, could legitimately achieve secession in a manner 
that would contravene international law; Article 46(1) of UNDRIP merely 
reiterates the established position.  
Another important point, of course, is that indigenous claims are 
virtually never expressed as a desire for secession.123  Simply asserting the 
right to self-determination does not mean sovereign independence would 
always be preferred. 124   The goal is almost always self-determination 
                                                      
116  See Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47; Katangese People’s Congress v Zaire, Afr. 
Comm’n. H.P.R., Comm. No. 75/92, para. 6 (1995); Loizidou v Turkey (Merits), 108 Eur. Ct. H.R. 443, 
471 (per Judge Wildhaber, joined by Judge Ryssdal) (1996).  See also XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 142-43. 
117  Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47, at 135; see also Lenzerini, supra note 81, at 174; 
XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 136. 
118  Anaya (1993), supra note 35; Anaya (2000), supra note 35.  
119  Anaya divides the substance into constitutive and ongoing self-determination; this article is only 
concerned with ongoing self-determination.  See Anaya supra note 35, (1993) at 145; Anaya (2000) at 9-12.  
120  Other options are established in, for example, G.A. Res. 1541 (1960) and the Friendly Relations 
Declaration, supra note 46. 
121  ANAYA (2000), supra note 35, at 13.  
122  See Kingsbury, supra note 79, at 502; ANAYA (2000), supra note 35, at 12; XANTHAKI, supra note 
29, at 152; Cassese, supra note 36, at 348-51.  
123  See Daes, supra note 33; Thornberry, supra note 45, at 53; Quane, supra note 31, at 266; Eide, 
supra note 4, at 172. 
124  Otto, supra note 2, at 72; Kingsbury, supra note 79, at 498; HIGGINS, supra note 35, at 25. 
MARCH 2013 UNDRIP AND THE INTERVENTION  269 
 
alongside the other peoples sharing the same state: interdependence rather 
than independence.125 
Nonetheless, indigenous peoples are justified in insisting that the right 
to self-determination in UNDRIP should not be read down as a lesser form 
of the right accorded to all other peoples.  The better interpretation is that 
indigenous self-determination is consistent with established international 
norms and equivalent to “traditional” self-determination in scope.  It is 
capable of encapsulating indigenous peoples’ own expressions of self-
determination and recognizing their fundamental right to equality, without 
any increased threat to the principles of state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.  The common but misguided assumption that the term “self-
determination” is interchangeable with the term “secession” should not be 
allowed to stand in the way of development of indigenous self-determination 
in parallel with the right to self-determination of all peoples.  States that are 
genuinely willing to engage with indigenous peoples in the spirit of 
UNDRIP have nothing to fear from its recognition of self-determination.   
C. Self-determination as Empowerment, through Freedom from 
Discrimination and Participation in Decision-Making 
Based on the preceding consideration of the background of self-
determination under international law, and analysis of the content and scope 
of the right as expressed in UNDRIP, it is possible to articulate a definition 
of the right as it should apply in the indigenous context.  The vexed question 
of whether indigenous peoples are “peoples” has been resolved by Article 3 
of UNDRIP, which provides indigenous peoples with the same unqualified 
right to self-determination recognized for “all peoples” under international 
law.  Although UNDRIP itself is not a source of binding legal obligations, 126 
some commentators assert that the right to self-determination of indigenous 
                                                      
125  Tennant, supra note 10; Corntassel & Hopkins, supra note 30; Murphy, supra note 2; Kingsbury, 
supra note 59, at 24; W. Sanders, “Towards an Indigenous Order of Australian Government: Rethinking 
Self-determination as Indigenous Affairs Policy,” Discussion Paper 230 (Centre for Aboriginal Economic 
Policy Research, Australian National University, 2002). 
126  The provisions of G.A. resolutions amount to recommendations, rather than obligations.  See U.N. 
Charter arts. 10-14.  States used this proposition to argue both for increasing and reducing protections while 
drafting UNDRIP.  See Barsh, supra note 26, 789.  As a declaration, UNDRIP will carry higher 
expectations toward compliance than an ordinary resolution.  ILA REPORT, supra note 3, at 840-41; Anaya 
REPORT 2008, supra note 30; Barelli, supra note 30.  However, many states have made a point of observing 
that it is an aspirational document, not a legal one, and compliance with its standards is not obligatory.  See, 
e.g., General Assembly meeting record, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 13, 2007); Declaration Press 
Release, supra note 48.  For more nuanced discussion on the status of G.A. resolutions, see Namibia, supra 
note 46, at para. 50; HIGGINS, supra note 35, at 22-28; FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANI, supra note 
99, at 65 et seq.   
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peoples enjoys customary status,127 equivalent to the settled status of the 
general right of peoples to self-determination as a right erga omnes under 
customary international law.128  Unfortunately, however, this assertion is not 
(yet) supported by the requisite elements of opinio juris 129  and state 
practice.130  The better view is that it is premature to assert that the right to 
self-determination of indigenous peoples has crystallized as a customary 
norm at this point in time.131  Nonetheless, UNDRIP’s adoption represents a 
significant step forward at the international level, and it will increase in 
status and relevance over time.   
Analysis of the text reveals that the right to self-determination in 
UNDRIP amounts to the empowerment of a people to control its own affairs, 
founded on two essential rights: the right to be free from discrimination, and 
the right to meaningful participation in decision-making.  This analysis is 
important for three reasons.  First, interpreting indigenous self-determination 
as founded on these two basic rights strips it of some of its controversy, by 
shifting the focus towards implementation of those rights as necessary 
prerequisites for substantive self-determination, instead of unnecessarily 
contentious issues around external self-determination.  In other words, self-
determination does not just mean secession. 
                                                      
127  See, e.g., ILA REPORT, supra note 3, at 909-10; Eide, supra note 4, at 157; Wiessner, supra notes 
4 and 5; Lenzerini, supra note 81, at 187; Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 33. 
128  East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 29 (1995); Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para. 88 
(2004). 
129  The process for including self-determination in UNDRIP was so fraught and controversial that it is 
doubtful the level of opinio juris meets the requisite standard: four states with significant indigenous 
populations voted against the adoption of UNDRIP, and many states who supported it expressly stated that 
they did not believe themselves to be bound by its provisions.  See General Assembly meeting record, 
supra note 126; Declaration Press Release, supra note 48.  Compare Lenzerini, supra note 81 and Anaya & 
Wiessner, supra note 33, who argue that this does not undermine opinio juris.   
130  The reality of life for indigenous peoples worldwide is generally far removed from any notion of 
self-determination on a factual level.  See MARTÍNEZ-COBO REPORT 1983, supra note 38; Cassidy, supra 
note 2; ANAYA REPORT 2008, supra note 30.  Numerous indigenous complaints brought before the HRC 
and regional human rights systems confirm that there are widespread problems with state practice regarding 
key indigenous issues, including control of traditional lands and natural resources, equality of rights, and 
political participation.  See, e.g., Endorois v. Kenya, African Comm’n H.P.R, Com. No. 276/2003 (2009); 
Maya (Toledo) v. Belize, supra note 44; Dann v. United States, supra note 44; Lubicon Lake Band v. 
Canada, supra note 38; Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. C/172 (Nov. 28, 
2007); Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., No. C/79 (Aug. 31, 2001); Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., No. C/125 (June 17, 2005); YATAMA v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 127, para. 214-220 (June 23, 2005); Moiwana v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 
(Feb. 8, 2006); Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006).  
131  XANTHAKI, supra note 29; Quane, supra note 31, at 261.  This conclusion does not preclude the 
right from acquiring that status in time, of course; on the contrary, it will be necessary for that to happen if 
the indigenous right to self-determination is to become truly equal to the right of “all peoples”, as this 
article argues it must.   
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Second, by recognizing that the fundamental relationship between 
participation, non-discrimination and self-determination under UNDRIP is 
consistent with established law deriving from the UN Charter and the 
Friendly Relations Declaration, it implies that indigenous and “traditional” 
self-determination need not and should not be perceived as different 
rights.132  The argument is not that self-determination for indigenous peoples 
is exactly identical in nature to self-determination for other peoples, but that 
they share common foundations and must be treated as equal in scope.  This 
opens the door for further unified development of the right to self-
determination for all peoples.133  
Finally, the analysis highlights the crucial shift towards empowerment 
that UNDRIP represents, which was previously lacking for indigenous 
peoples under the international human rights framework.  As such, UNDRIP 
provides an important benchmark of the standards required to ensure 
indigenous peoples achieve full enjoyment of their rights.   
Nonetheless, if UNDRIP is not implemented by states, its potential 
will be frustrated, as illustrated in Australia.  Australia was influential in the 
development of the draft,134 but ultimately voted against UNDRIP’s adoption 
in the GA, citing dissatisfaction with the inclusion of self-determination as 
an important factor in its negative vote.135  On April 3, 2009, however, 
Australia announced its support for UNDRIP.136  UN experts hailed this as a 
crucial step in increasing the international consensus on indigenous rights,137 
but the careful language of Australia’s official endorsement cautions against 
any hasty conclusion that Australia’s fundamental position on the core issues 
of contention had changed.138 
On the whole, it would be unrealistic to argue that Australia is 
currently under a clear legal obligation to ensure indigenous self-
determination in accordance with UNDRIP.  As soft law, UNDRIP is not 
binding, and it cannot yet be said that indigenous self-determination is a 
                                                      
132  Compare Quane, supra note 31, at 267 (identifying the common foundations, but seeing UNDRIP 
as a departure from existing law). 
133  This approach is supported by ANAYA (2000), supra note 35, at 6-12; Henriksen, supra note 69, at 
141.  
134  Daes, supra note 26, at 798; Daes, supra note 33, at 16. 
135  General Assembly meeting record, supra note 126, at 11. 
136  Macklin, supra note 97. 
137  Statement by Special Rapporteur James Anaya, United Nations Expert Mechanism on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP) Chairperson John Henriksen and UNPFII Chairperson Victoria Tauli-
Corpuz, UN Experts Welcome Australia’s Endorsement of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (April 3, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/ 
Australia_endorsement_UNDRIP.pdf.   
138  Macklin, supra note 97.  The single mention of self-determination avoids using the word “right” 
and repeats that UNDRIP cannot be used to undermine territorial integrity. 
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customary norm of international law; nor has it been incorporated into 
Australia’s domestic law.  However, Australia is actually under binding 
international obligations in respect of the foundations of self-determination: 
non-discrimination and participation;139 on this basis it arguably does have 
an indirect obligation to uphold indigenous self-determination.  Moreover, 
Australia has recognized that it will be measured against UNDRIP’s 
standards, and has itself referred to some of UNDRIP’s provisions when 
defending NTER.140  Indigenous self-determination has been a prominent 
issue in Australia in the past,141 and its relevance will gather new momentum 
as UNDRIP’s influence develops under international law.  Already there is 
considerable pressure within Australia for attitudes towards indigenous self-
determination to develop in line with international standards, and for the 
federal, state and territory governments to show they are truly dedicated to 
implementing the goals of UNDRIP.142 
Having articulated the ingredients of indigenous self-determination at 
the international level, the remainder of this article considers the 
international legal foundations of self-determination at the domestic level.  
The next section discusses the Intervention, as a topical example in which 
the fundamental prerequisites for indigenous self-determination have been 
lacking.  Australia has vacillated between support and opposition for 
UNDRIP, but the measures it took in 2007 to address indigenous 
disadvantage were wholly inconsistent with any notion of empowerment, 
and thus with the developing norm of self-determination in international law.   
Looking back at the lessons of the Intervention is important 
preparation for the next stage in Australia’s battle to move beyond current 
levels of entrenched indigenous disadvantage.  It is also relevant beyond its 
domestic context because it illustrates that existing protections of the 
fundamental rights underpinning self-determination have been inadequate to 
guarantee full enjoyment of the rights of indigenous peoples on an equal 
                                                      
139  See infra, sections III(B) and III(C). 
140  ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, para. 48, 54. 
141  See Sanders, supra note 125; Peter Billings, Still Paying the Price for Benign Intentions? 
Contextualising Contemporary Interventions in the Lives of Aboriginal Peoples, 33 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 
1 (2009); Geoffrey Partington, Hasluck versus Coombs: White Politics and Australia's Aboriginals, 
electronic pdf version (2005), available at www.bennelong.com.au/books/pdf/PartingtonWeb.pdf. 
142  See, e.g., the work of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, 
available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/index.html; the widely-endorsed statement entitled 
“Rebuilding from the Ground Up: Alternative to the Intervention” initiated by STICS and the Intervention 
Rollback Action Group (demanding that all indigenous policy comply with UNDRIP), available at 
http://stoptheintervention.org/alternatives-to-the-intervention (last visited Oct. 16, 2011); numerous 
submissions to the Senate inquiry in connection with the Stronger Futures package are available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=clac_ctte/strong_futu
re_nt_11/submissions.htm. 
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level with other peoples, and serves as a warning of the consequences that 
arise when a state attempts to improve the situation of indigenous peoples 
without adhering to evolving standards of international law.   
 
III. INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION AND NTER 
The Intervention is a victory for anybody obtuse enough to 
believe that human misery can be alleviated while ignoring 
human dignity.143 
This section starts by introducing the background and key features of 
the Intervention.  It then applies the interpretation of self-determination 
advocated above to NTER, by examining in more depth the two major rights 
underpinning indigenous self-determination in international law, and 
assessing the extent to which NTER demonstrates a failure on Australia’s 
part to comply with these norms.  
A. The Intervention 
1. Ampe Akelyernemane Meke Mekarle: Little Children Are Sacred 
On August 8, 2006, following growing concern about the issue of 
child abuse in Aboriginal communities,144 the NT government appointed a 
Board of Inquiry (“the Board”) to investigate the prevalence of sexual abuse 
of Aboriginal children in NT communities, particularly unreported abuse, 
and to consider how to improve governmental and non-governmental 
practices and procedures to “effectively prevent and tackle child abuse.”145  
After extensive research, including wide consultations with Aboriginal 
peoples and service providers, the Board provided its report, Little Children 
Are Sacred, to the NT government on April 30, 2007.  The report was 
released publicly on June 15, 2007. 
Little Children Are Sacred confirmed that child abuse was a serious 
problem in Aboriginal communities in NT and that it often went 
unreported. 146   Harrowing stories documented by the Board exposed a 
disturbing range of patterns and cycles of abuse and sexualization of 
children, with frequent violations of both “mainstream” law and long 
established Aboriginal laws, often perpetrated by children or young people 
                                                      
143  Nicole Watson, Of Course It Wouldn't Be Done in Dickson! Why Howard's Battlers Disengaged 
From the Northern Territory Emergency Response, 8 Borderlands e-journal 1, 17 (2009). 
144  See Marcia Langton, Trapped in the Aboriginal Reality Show, 19 GRIFFITH REVIEW (2007). 
145  LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14, at 4.  The two Board members and co-chairs, Rex 
Wild QC and Patricia Anderson, were appointed under the Northern Territory Inquiries Act 2006 (Aust.). 
146  LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14, at 16. 
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themselves, both male and female.147  Such reports give rise to extreme 
concern about Australia’s compliance with international obligations to 
protect the rights of children.148  The Board recommended that Aboriginal 
child sexual abuse in the Northern Territory be designated as an issue of 
urgent national significance.   
The Board warned against a crisis-driven, band-aid response, 
however, and took pains to dispel various myths perpetuated in the 
mainstream media about the nature of and reasons behind Aboriginal child 
abuse.149  The Board pointed out that similar and significant problems of 
child abuse and neglect exist in all sectors of society, nationally and 
internationally, and that in NT as elsewhere it is a direct symptom of other 
areas of social breakdown caused by “the usual suspects”–for example 
poverty, a lack of education, poor health, alcohol and drug abuse, 
unemployment, overcrowded housing, and general disempowerment.150  The 
Board emphasized that many reports presented over the years had illustrated 
the same problems and suggested the same solutions for tackling these wider 
issues 151 –that the recommendations in Little Children Are Sacred were 
nothing new, but decisive action was long overdue. 152   Noting that 
realistically it might take a generation for the real benefits of change to be 
felt, they stressed it was imperative the first steps be taken immediately as a 
matter of extreme urgency to avert a looming disaster.153  It required: 
[A] concerted, determined effort to break the cycle and provide 
the necessary strength, power and appropriate support to local 
services and communities, so they can lead themselves out of 
the malaise: in a word, empowerment!154   
These central messages of the need for genuine empowerment and the 
urgency of the situation were repeated in compelling language throughout 
the Board’s descriptions of its consultations with Aboriginal people and its 
97 specific recommendations for action.  
                                                      
147  LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14, at 59-73. 
148  See especially the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 19, Month, Day, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3.  Australia ratified the Convention in 1990. 
149  See, e.g., LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14, at 12, 57-59. 
150  LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14.  For a description of living conditions in remote 
Aboriginal communities, see Steven Etherington, The Most Threatened People in Australia: The Remote 
Aboriginal Minority, in Johns (ed.), supra note 57, at 59-77; Langton, supra note 144. 
151  LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14, at 13. 
152  See also Howard-Wagner, supra note 2; Langton, supra note 144. 
153  LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14, at 6. 
154  LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14, at 13 (emphasis in original). 
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2. Key Features of the Intervention 
Australia’s response to Little Children Are Sacred picked up on the 
message of urgency, but it did so at the expense of the opportunity to build 
empowerment.  On June 15, 2007, the day the report was publicly released, 
the federal government issued a press release declaring it was committed to 
doing “whatever it takes to bring an end to this insidious behaviour in 
Indigenous communities.”155  Six days later, Australia announced it would 
be launching an emergency intervention into Aboriginal communities in 
NT.156  State and federal troops were deployed in NT shortly thereafter.157   
Within just seven weeks, a comprehensive and complex suite of 
legislation had been approved by federal Parliament.158  Prime Minister John 
Howard said the federal government was taking over with a “sweeping 
assumption of power.” 159  The government said action was necessary to 
“stabilise” communities before the “normalisation” and “exit” phases could 
begin.160  Aboriginal communities were described as a “failed society.”161 
Reforms included significant changes to the welfare system, including 
compulsory income management and linking welfare payments to children’s 
school attendance; restrictions on sales and use of alcohol and pornography 
                                                      
155  Mal Brough, CGA Press Release, NT Child Abuse Inquiry (June 15, 2007), available at 
http://www.formerministers.fahcsia.gov.au/3517/ntcai_15jun07/, (last visitedFeb. 4, 2013). 
156  Mal Brough & John Howard, CGA Media Release, National Emergency Response to Protect 
Aboriginal Children in the NT (June 21, 2007), available at http://www.formerministers.fahcsia.gov.au/ 
3581/emergency_21june07/, (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). [hereinafter Brough & Howard Press Release]. 
157  Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Insiders, Interview with Mal Brough MP (June 24, 
2007) available at http://www.abc.net.au/insiders/content/2007/s1960087.htm, last visited Apr. 2, 2011) 
[hereinafter “Brough Insiders Interview”]. 
158  See Jonathon Hunyor, Is It Time to Re-Think Special Measures Under the Racial Discrimination 
Act?: The Case of the Northern Territory Intervention, 14 AUS. J. OF HUM. RTS. 39, 59 (2009).  The initial 
Intervention legislation package comprised five statutes: Northern Territory National Emergency Response 
Act 2007 (Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter NTERA]; Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare 
Payment Reform) Act 2007 (Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter “WPRA”]; Families, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation Amendment (Northern Territory National Emergency Response 
and Other Measures) Act 2007 (Cth) and two appropriation Acts.  
159  John Howard PM, Address to the Sydney Institute (June 25, 2007) available at 
http://www.antar.org.au/node/86, (last visited 2 Apr. 2011) [hereinafter “Howard Sydney Institute 
Address”].  For discussion of concerns about the excessive and ultra vires exercise of federal executive 
power within NT, see Wurridjal v Australia [2009] HCA 2, per Kirby J (dissent), para. 226-234 (Austl.) 
and Greg McIntyre, An Imbalance of Constitutional Power and Human Rights: The 2007 Federal 
Intervention in the Northern Territory, 14 JAMES COOK U. L. REV. 81, 94-100 (2007). 
160  See CGA, Official Committee Hansard, Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Reference: Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Bill 
2007 and Four Related Bills Concerning the Northern Territory National Emergency Response (Aug. 10, 
2007), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S10473.pdf [hereinafter Committee 
Hansard 2007]; Howard, supra note 159. 
161  CGA, House of Representatives, Official Hansard, Northern Territory National Emergency 
Response Bill 2007: second reading speech by Mal Brough MP (Aug. 7, 2007), available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/reps/dailys/ dr070807.pdf [hereinafter Second Reading NTER].  
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in prescribed areas; the acquisition and control of Aboriginal townships 
through compulsory five-year leases to the government; an increased police 
presence in NT communities; the appointment of external managers of all 
government business in communities; and the removal of customary law as 
mitigation in sentencing and bail decisions.162 
NTER represented a “remarkable governmental intrusion by the 
Commonwealth into the daily lives of Australian citizens in the Northern 
Territory, identified mostly by reference to their race.”163  In the words of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, “the 
extent to which the Intervention would shift the social, cultural and legal 
landscapes of Aboriginal communities in NT was immediately obvious.”164  
The full scope of Intervention measures is too wide to cover in detail here, 
particularly as the focus of the critique is on the overarching approach, not 
the substance of the numerous different policies introduced under NTER 
umbrella.  Where specific examples are required to support the arguments in 
this article, the author has chosen to focus mainly on the compulsory income 
management regime, in an attempt to engage with issues central to one of 
the most controversial reforms introduced by NTER.  NTER Review Board 
in 2008 observed that income management “has become synonymous with 
NTER and is the most widely recognized measure.” 165   The regime 
continues to have significant ongoing relevance not only because it affects a 
large number of people on a day-to-day level, but because legislative 
amendments have broadened and extended income management. 
Compulsory income management for welfare recipients was one of 
the major reforms of the Intervention, and one in which the procedural and 
substantive failings of Australia’s approach were particularly glaring. 166  
Under the regime, 50% of individuals’ income support and 100% of 
                                                      
162  See McIntyre, supra note 159, at 84-91; Billings, supra note 141; COERCIVE RECONCILIATION: 
STABILISE, NORMALISE, EXIT ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIA (Jon Altman & Melinda Hinkson eds., 2007) 
[hereinafter COERCIVE RECONCILIATION].   
163  Wurridjal v. Australia para. 243 (Kirby J. dissenting).  
164  HREOC, REPORT OF THE ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER SOCIAL JUSTICE 
COMMISSIONER, Social Justice Report 2007 (Report Jan. 2008), available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/socia
l_justice/sj_report/sjreport 07/pdf/sjr_2007.pdf [hereinafter HREOC SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2007]. 
165  REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24, at 20. 
166  This article only considers the regime under the Social Security Administration Act 1991 (Cth) 
[hereinafter SSAA], s 123UB (inserted by WPRA, Schedule 1, s 17 but repealed by WRRRDA, s 12), 
triggered by a beneficiary’s physical presence in a relevant Northern Territory area (as distinct from the 
regime under SSAA, ss 123UC-123UF).  Regimes set up in other parts of Australia have operated 
differently; the Northern Territory version is the “most punitive and oppressive.”  See J. Sutton, Emergency 
Welfare Reforms: A Mirror to the Past?, 33 ALT. L.J. 27 (2008).  See also Thalia Anthony, The Return to 
the Legal and Citizenship Void: Indigenous Welfare Quarantining in the Northern Territory and Cape 
York, 10 BALAYI: CULTURE L. AND COLONIALISM 29 (2009); Peter Billings, Social Welfare Experiments in 
Australia: More Trials for Aboriginal Families?, 17 J. SOCIAL SECURITY L. 164 (2010). 
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advances and lump sum payments made to them are diverted to an income 
management account controlled by the national welfare agency.167  After 
deduction of expenses like rent and fines, the quarantined portion can only 
be spent in specially licensed stores using a “BasicsCard” that clearly 
identifies the holder as subject to income management; this money is not 
accessible as cash.168  The quarantined portion is to be used for “priority 
needs” such as food and clothing,169 and cannot be spent on excluded goods 
and services, including alcohol, pornography, gambling and tobacco.170 
Compulsory income management constitutes a significant interference 
with the daily lives and choices of those affected, at a very personal level.  
This is not to say that some participants might not find it beneficial, and a 
case could certainly be made for implementing voluntary income 
management systems, as a matter of policy.171  But the crucial point to be 
highlighted here is that the original reforms were imposed on all welfare 
recipients in the prescribed areas with no room for differentiation on the 
basis of individual circumstances.  It seems Australia believed blanket 
restrictions on individuals were justified by supposed benefits for the wider 
community: the primary purpose was to “manage income flow to each 
community as a whole” in order to “encourage expenditure on those goods 
and services that will lead to better outcomes for the children in those 
communities.”172  The Prime Minister described the overriding objective of 
income quarantining as being “to reduce the amount of money finding its 
way towards alcohol and drugs in indigenous communities during the 
emergency period.”  Part of the motivation was to provide “a clear signal to 
the communities.”173   
NTER also removed the right of appeal to the Social Security Appeals 
Tribunal and Administrative Appeals Tribunal, leaving no feasible option for 
                                                      
167  See Social Security Administration Act (“SSAA”), ss 123XA-123XH (repealed).   
168  SSAA, s 123YE, as amended by WPRA, Schedule 1, s 17. 
169  SSAA, s 123TH.  
170  SSAA, s 123TI.  
171  Both the REVIEW BOARD REPORT in 2008, supra note 24 at 20-21, and the CGA, NORTHERN 
TERRITORY EMERGENCY RESPONSE EVALUATION REPORT 2011 [hereinafter 2011 NTER EVALUATION 
REPORT], are available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/nter_reports/Documents/nter_eval
uation_report_2011.pdf (providing anecdotal evidence that a number of community members subject to 
income management, particularly women, found it useful in avoiding “humbugging” from family members 
for cash and in ensuring that sufficient funds were budgeted for meeting family needs.).   
172  CGA, SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, REPORT, SOCIAL 
SECURITY AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT (WELFARE PAYMENT REFORM) BILL 2007 AND FOUR 
RELATED BILLS CONCERNING THE NORTHERN TERRITORY NATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PARA. 2.63 
(AUGUST 2007), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/20
04-07/nt_emergency/report/report.pdf [hereinafter SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT 2007]. 
173  Howard, supra note 159. 
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external review to challenge income quarantining in any particular case.174  
The explanation for this extraordinary departure from due process was that 
appeals would “take too long and interfere with the Intervention timeframe;” 
it was implied that the abrogation of appeal rights was unimportant anyway 
because “people would only have their income managed for 12 months, and 
it would only be half of it.”175  
3. Criticism of the Intervention  
The initial Intervention methodology has been extensively 
criticized,176 including by the Northern Territory Government,177 the authors 
of Little Children Are Sacred, 178  and Aboriginal representatives:  for 
example, Galarrwuy Yunupingu, an Aboriginal leader who initially 
supported the Intervention, withdrew his support and in August 2009 
described it as a form of apartheid,179 and a group of Aboriginal people from 
various NT communities submitted a request for urgent action to the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”),180 while 
others lodged claims for refugee status in protest.181  As noted above, there is 
no denying that action was urgently required.182  The major success of the 
Intervention is that it focused national attention on the problems afflicting 
NT communities and stimulated a large injection of much-needed funding 
for increased service provision and infrastructure within those communities.  
However, the anecdotal evidence, along with what little reliable empirical 
                                                      
174  SSAA, s 144(ka), inserted by WPRA, Schedule 1, s 18 (now repealed); National Welfare Rights 
Network, Submission No. 44 to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (2007), available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-07/nt_emergency/ 
submissions/sub44.pdf; Billings, supra note 141. 
175  Senate Committee Report 2007, supra note 172, para. 2.64.  A right of appeal through the Social 
Security Appeals Tribunal was provided in 2009. 
176  Individual critics are too numerous to list here; for a summary of major problems, see Altman & 
Hinkson (eds.), supra note 162; ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, ay Appendix B; Request for Urgent 
Action under ICERD in relation to the Commonwealth Government of Australia (Jan. 28, 2009, updated 
Aug. 11, 2009) submitted by a group of Aboriginal Australians affected by NTER, through legal 
representatives, available at http://www.hrlrc.org.au/files/E75QFXXYE7/Request_for_Urgent_Action_ 
Cerd.pdf and http://www.hrlrc.org.au/files/Update-to-CERD-11-August-2009.pdf [hereinafter “ICERD 
Request”]. 
177  Northern Territory Government, Submission No. 127 to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-
7/nt_emergency/submissions/sub127.pdf. 
178  Lateline: Business, interview with Rex Wild QC, ABC, June 27, 2007, available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2007/s1964086.htm, (last visited Apr. 2, 2011); Rex Wild QC, 
Unforeseen Circumstances, in Altman & Hinkson (eds.), supra note 162, at 111-20.  
179  Ben Schokman, Opinion: Sorry About the Intervention, 35 ALT. L.J. 2, 2 (2010). 
180 ICERD Request, supra note 176. 
181 Phoebe Stewart, Aboriginal People Seek Refugee Status, ABC NEWS, Aug. 26, 2009, available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/08/26/2667066.htm?site=news, (last visited Apr. 6, 2011). 
182  See Langton, supra note 144; LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14. 
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evidence there is, suggests that the approach taken by the Australian 
government when it launched the Intervention may have contributed more to 
some of the underlying problems than to their solutions–even where 
individual measures might themselves have otherwise been welcomed.183  
Although all action at the national level was purportedly designed to protect 
children from harm in response to Little Children Are Sacred, 184  the 
Intervention did not implement the report’s 97 specific recommendations.185   
State representatives claimed to have closely considered Australia’s 
international obligations when drafting the Intervention legislation. 186  
However, NTER (including the income management regime in particular) 
was widely condemned as inconsistent with Australia’s international human 
rights obligations.187  The criticism was characterized by two major recurring 
themes: first, that the Intervention was racially discriminatory, and second, 
that people living in target communities were not given a chance to be 
involved in designing or implementing the measures that were ostensibly 
intended to protect their rights, and those of their children.188  Subsequent 
efforts in 2009 and 2010 to amend NTER and increase participation were a 
step in the right direction, but they did not adequately remedy these 
deficiencies.189  
                                                      
183  See, e.g., Larissa Behrendt, Back to the Future for Indigenous Australia, in ALL THAT’S LEFT: 
WHAT LABOR SHOULD STAND FOR 113-34 (Nick Dyrenfurth & Tim Soutphomasane eds., 2010); Nicholas 
Rothwell, Destroyed in Alice, THE AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 19, 2011; AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT: DEPT. OF 
FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES, AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, CLOSING THE GAP: ENGAGEMENT 
AND PARTNERSHIP WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/our-
responsibilities/indigenous-australians/programs-services/closing-the-gap/closing-the-gap-engagement-
and-partnership-with-indigenous-people, (last visited July 8, 2012) [hereinafter CLOSING THE GAP]; 
HREOC SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2007, supra note 164; REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24; ICERD 
Request, supra note 176; Billings, supra note 141; CULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS RESEARCH CENTRE 
AUSTRALIA, REPORT ON NTER REDESIGN ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION (2009), 
available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/nter_reports/Documents/redesign_engagement_
strategy/final_report_09_engage_strat.pdf, [hereinafter CIRCA REPORT 2009]; NTER EVALUATION 
REPORT 2011, supra note 171; CGA, Senate, Proof Hansard, Social Security Legislation Amendment Bill 
2011, Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Bill 2012, Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory 
(Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2011–Second (June 28, 2012), available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hanssen261110 [hereinafter Stronger Futures 
Senate Hansard 2012]. 
184  See Brough & Howard Media Release, supra note 156. 
185  ICERD Request, supra note 176, para. 6. 
186  Committee Hansard 2007, supra note 160, at 11. 
187  See ANAYA REPORT 2008, supra note 30; ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, at Appendix B. 
188  These themes are evident throughout the criticism, and reflected in NTER Review Board’s 
recommendations. See REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 183.  See also ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra 
note 38. 
189  See Vivian, supra note 19; Amnesty International, Submission No. 19 supra note 19; HREOC 
REPORT ON RDA AND SPECIAL MEASURES, supra note 19; see also infra III(B)(2) and III(C)(2).  
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These two themes of criticism form the parameters of discussion in 
the next two sections.  With any high-profile policy initiative there will 
always be those who think it is inadequate and those who argue it went too 
far.  Many critics of the critics viewed the outcry over the human rights 
violations of the Intervention methods as masking the true need for a 
response on behalf of children and other vulnerable people living in 
struggling communities; some argued consultations and negotiations were a 
waste of time, and said the communities needed tough love.190  A detailed 
consideration of the political arguments advanced in support of various 
positions on both sides of the fence is beyond the scope of this article, which 
is limited to an assessment of Australia’s methodology against the criteria of 
participation and non-discrimination that the author has identified as 
fundamental to fostering self-determination under international law.   
From this perspective, the paternalistic approach taken in NTER is 
strikingly at odds with the standards in UNDRIP, which are minimum 
standards of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual 
respect.191  This claim is not to privilege matters of process and procedure 
over the substance of the problems that NTER purported to target; it comes 
from a recognition that no matter how laudable the motives, lasting change 
cannot be effected if the steps taken to address the crisis themselves violate 
the rights of the intended beneficiaries.  The methodology of NTER lacked 
both essential foundations for self-determination: the rights to freedom from 
discrimination and participation in decision-making.  The next two sections 
develop this argument by examining each of those foundations in more 
detail under international law, and analyzing their application in NT. 
B. The Right to be Free from Racial Discrimination 
1. International Law 
International law provides a clear and well-established universal right 
to be free from discrimination.  Besides its inclusion in numerous 
international and regional instruments,192 non-discrimination is arguably a 
non-derogable jus cogens norm and a right erga omnes under customary 
international law.193   The principle of non-discrimination “permeates the 
                                                      
190  See, e.g., Langton, supra note 144; PETER SUTTON, THE POLITICS OF SUFFERING: INDIGENOUS 
AUSTRALIA AND THE END OF THE LIBERAL CONSENSUS (2009).    
191  UNDRIP, preambular para. 24; art. 43. ( 
192  See, e.g., U.N. Charter, arts. 1(3), 13(1)(b), 55(c), 56, 76(c); UDHR, arts. 1, 2, 7; ICCPR, arts. 2, 
26; ICESCR arts. 2(2), 3; ICERD, art. 2; ILO Convention 169, art. 6.  
193  See, e.g., South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), 1966 I.C.J. 293, para. 6 (1966) (per Judge 
Tanaka dissenting); Barcelona Traction, Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, para. 32 (1970); Juridical Condition and 
Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, 
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guarantee of all other rights and freedoms under domestic and international 
law.” 194   UNDRIP emphasizes that indigenous peoples are equal to all 
others, and that they have the right, collectively and individually, to freedom 
from any kind of discrimination.195 
The pertinent elements of the definition of racial discrimination in 
Article 1.1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (1969) (“CERD”) can be summarized, for present 
purposes, as any distinction that is based on race, and has the purpose or 
effect of impairing equal enjoyment of rights in any field of public life.  
Historically, attempts to address discrimination against indigenous 
peoples have commonly taken either an integrationist/assimilationist 
approach, or a paternalist/protectionist approach, which are themselves 
discriminatory.196  The first of these treats equality as “sameness:” the idea 
has been to assimilate indigenous peoples into the dominant culture so that 
differences are eventually eroded.197  The second approach, paternalism, is 
particularly prevalent in colonialist state-indigenous relationships: states 
claim to be protecting indigenous peoples by deciding what is good for 
them.  Tennant describes it as the “primitivisation” of indigenous peoples.198 
International attitudes have largely shifted away from these 
approaches.199  UNDRIP reflects this evolution, placing a high value on 
diversity and respect for cultural differences, and emphasizing the need to 
foster partnerships with indigenous peoples as an element of their right to 
self-determination, instead of imposing assistance in a top-down manner.200  
2.  Discrimination in NTER 
Unfortunately, the Intervention flew in the face of these 
developments.  Special Rapporteur Anaya considered the original 
Intervention measures to be aggressive and extraordinary, with deep 
implications for a range of fundamental rights, but especially for the right to 
                                                                                                                                                              
para. 173(4) (Sept. 17, 2003). See also ICCPR, art. 4(1); Anaya Report 2010, supra note 38, at Appendix B, 
para. 18, 60; INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 78 (HENRY STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN 
GOODMAN, EDS., 3d ed. 2008). 
194  Maya (Toledo) v. Belize, supra note 44, at para. 163.  See also HRC, General Comment No 23, 
supra note 78; Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, supra note 193, at para. 101; Legal Resources 
Foundation v. Zambia, African Comm’n on Human and People’s Rights, Communication No. 211/98, para. 
63 (2001).  
195  SeeUNDRIP preamble, arts. 2, 4, 5, 9, 18, 22; arts 1, 2, 9, 14-17, 21, 22, 24, 29, 44, 46, supra note 
90; Barelli, supra note 30, at 961. 
196  For Australian examples, see Billings, supra note 141; Chesterman & Douglas, supra note 2. 
197  See Otto, supra note 2; Falk, supra note 30, at 33. 
198  Tennant, supra note 10. 
199  See, e.g., Eide, supra note 4, at 163-67; MARTÍNEZ-COBO REPORT 1983, supra note 38, at para. 42. 
200  See, e.g., UNDRIP preamble, arts. 1, 2, 8-15, 19, 38.  
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non-discrimination.201  Similar concerns about the discriminatory aspects of 
NTER were expressed by the HRC,202 CERD,203 and the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”),204 as well as by many 
others within Australia.205 
Australia is a party to ICERD.206  Section 9(1) of the RDA, which 
makes acts of racial discrimination by any person unlawful in Australia, 
incorporates in full the definition of racial discrimination from article 1.1 
ICERD summarized above.207  Applying this definition to the original NTER 
income management regime, it is clear that these measures made a 
distinction on the basis of race, which had the effect of impairing the 
enjoyment of rights on an equal footing with other Australians in a number 
of spheres of public life. 
As to the first element, state officials asserted that the Intervention 
was not a matter of race, 208  and sidestepped direct questions about 
discrimination. 209   However, the legislation itself and its explanatory 
memoranda leave no room for doubt that NTER was aimed specifically at 
Aboriginal people.  The blanket application of the income management 
regime, for example, was triggered by an individual’s physical presence in 
“prescribed areas” under the Northern Territory Emergency Response Act 
2007 (Cth; NTERA).210  Subsections 4(2)(a) and (b) of NTERA expressly 
                                                      
201  ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, at para. 46 and Appendix B para. 2.  
202  Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5 
para. 14 (May 7, 2009). 
203  Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Urgent Action Letters to the Australian 
Government (Mar. 13, 2009 and Sept. 28, 2009), available at http://www.hrlc.org.au/content/topics/ 
equality/northern-territory-intervention-request-for-urgent-action-cerd/, (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) 
[hereinafter CERD Urgent Action Letters]; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
Concluding Observations: Australia, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/AUS/CO/15-17 (Aug. 27, 2010) [hereinafter 
CERD Report 2010].  
204  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Australia, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/AUS/CO/4, para. 15 (June 12, 2009).  
205  See, e.g., numerous submissions to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiri es/2004-
07/nt_emergency/submissions/sublist.htm, (last visited Apr. 1, 2011); HREOC SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 
2007, supra note 164; Altman & Hinkson, supra note 162; REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24; Vivian, 
supra note 19, at 46; Billings, supra notes 141 and 166; Chesterman & Douglas, supra note 2; Watson, 
supra note 143; Yananymul Munungurr, CEO of Laynhapuy Homelands Association Incorporated, Stop 
the Intervention: Self-Determination not Assimilation, Homelands address (June 20, 2009), available at 
http://rollbacktheintervention.wordpress.com/statements (last visited Nov. 10, 2010); ICERD Request, 
supra note 176; Graeme Innes, Race Discrimination Commissioner (HREOC), Address to UN Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Aug. 11, 2010), available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about/
media/speeches/race/2010/20100811_CERD.html (last visited 6 Apr. 2011.) 
206  Australia signed on October 13, 1966 and ratified on September 30, 1975. 
207  The Act binds the Crown.  See RDA, s 6. 
208  Howard Sydney Institute Address, supra note 159. 
209  Brough Insiders interview, supra note 157. 
210  See SSAA, ss 123UB and 123TD(a) (both repealed).   
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tied the meaning of “prescribed areas” to the definition of Aboriginal land 
within the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976.  The 
prescribed areas covered about 600,000 kilometers, containing 500 
communities occupied almost entirely by Aboriginal people; seventy percent 
of the Aboriginal population of NT live in those areas.211   
Putting the racial nature of the regime beyond doubt is the fact that the 
Intervention legislation expressly excluded the operation of Part II of the 
RDA in respect of NTER measures.212  The RDA is an “exhaustive and 
exclusive” statement of the law on racial discrimination in Australia,213 
enacted for the purpose of implementing ICERD domestically. 214   The 
inference is that suspending this legislation would only be necessary if 
NTER measures contravened its protections.215  This inference is reinforced 
by Section 10 RDA, which provides that any law operating to deny or 
reduce the equal enjoyment of rights on a racial basis will have no effect on 
the enjoyment of those rights.  If Australia had not excluded the RDA, 
Section 10 would have prevented implementation of the racially 
discriminatory measures of the Intervention.216 
The conclusion that there was a racial distinction is unavoidable.  As 
for the second element of the discrimination test, which checks the purpose 
or effect of the distinction, the purpose of the income management regime 
was to “stem the flow of cash that is expended on substance abuse and 
gambling” for the protection of children.217  Leaving aside the question of 
whether compulsory income management for adults is an appropriate or 
effective means of protecting children,218 that protection is, of course, a valid 
objective.  However, the actual effect of the distinction has been a significant 
impairment of the exercise of various rights protected under international 
human rights law, such as the right to equality before the law,219 including in 
respect of treatment before tribunals,220 the right to social security,221 the 
                                                      
211  See ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38. 
212  NTERA, s131(2).   
213  Viskauskas v Niland [1983] HCA 15, para. 8 (Austl.).  
214  Id.  See also RDA, preamble; Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen [1982] HCA 27, para. 5 (Austl.); 
Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11 (Austl.); Viskauskas v Niland [1983] HCA 15 (Austl.).   
215  Arguably it was unnecessary to do this expressly because under Australian law a later Act that is 
inconsistent with an earlier Act is deemed to repeal the earlier one to the extent of the inconsistency.  See 
McIntyre, supra note 159, at 107, discussing Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 99 (Austl.).  
216  RDA, s 10 reflects ICERD, art. 2(1)(c); see Viskauskas v Niland, supra note 213 at para. 10.  
217  NTERB Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at 11. 
218  See Billings, supra note 166; Howard-Wagner, supra note 2; Behrendt, supra note 183. 
219  UDHR, art. 7; ICCPR, art. 26. 
220  ICERD, art. 5(a); ICCPR, art. 14. 
221  ICESCR, art. 9; ICERD, art. 5(e)(iv).  See also Billings, supra note 166. 
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right to an effective remedy,222 the right to enjoy one’s culture,223 and the 
right to an adequate standard of living. 224   It clearly breaches many 
provisions of UNDRIP.225   
The strong emphasis on racial equality that permeates general human 
rights law, and particularly UNDRIP, has been severely undermined in 
Australia through NTER.  It is inconceivable that the same punitive 
approaches would be taken in response to reports of child abuse in other 
sectors of Australian society.226   
Senior Australian government officials responsible for orchestrating 
the Intervention were dismissive of UN criticism.227  International human 
rights mechanisms have had difficulty breaking through in Australia. 228  
However, the federal government’s own assessment report also raised 
discrimination as a serious concern, and recommended action to reinstate the 
RDA in NT.229  The resulting legislative amendments implemented some 
necessary changes, 230  but their practical effect for those already under 
income management was limited. 231   Critics said nothing less than full 
reinstatement of the RDA was sufficient and that NTER as redesigned was 
still discriminatory in fact.232  Certainly it is unlikely the formal legislative 
                                                      
222  ICERD, art. 6.  See also Wurridjal v Australia, (Kirby J. dissenting), para. 213-4 (about a 
challenge to compulsory leases under NTER).  
223  ICCPR, art. 27.  See also Vivian, supra note 70. 
224  ICESCR, art. 11; UDHR, art. 25. 
225  See, e.g., arts. 9, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21-23. 
226  See Watson, supra note 143; Amnesty International, supra note 19; Billings, supra note 141.  See 
also Wurridjal v Australia, (Kirby J. dissenting). 
227  Natasha Robinson, Howard Ministers Dismiss U.N. Criticism of Indigenous Intervention, THE 
AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 29, 2009. 
228  See Sylvia Arzey & Luke McNamara, Invoking International Human Rights Law in a ‘Rights-
Free Zone’: Indigenous Justice Campaigns in Australia, 33 HUM. RTS. Q. 733 (2011). 
229  REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24. 
230  See, e.g., repealing the provisions expressly excluding anti-discrimination legislation (WRRRDA, 
Schedule 1) and repealing SSAA, s 123UB (see supra, note 166). 
231  WRRRDA repeals SSAA, s 123UB but continues income management for those who were 
already subject to it under that provision.  It also adds new categories of eligibility for income management: 
“vulnerable welfare recipients”, “disengaged youth”, and “long-term welfae recipients” (SSAA, ss 
123UCA, 123UCB and 123UCC respectively).  Concerns about the amended regime were expressed by 
HREOC. See Submission to the ICERD Committee (July 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/legal/submissions/united_nations/ICERD2010.html, (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) 
[hereinafter HREOC Submission 2010].  
232  See Amnesty International, supra note 19; Nicholson et al., supra note 19; HREOC Report on 
RDA and Special Measures, supra note 19; Alastair Nicholson, The Failure of the Rudd Government’s 
Aboriginal Policy, Stop the Intervention Collective Sydney (STICS) Forum (March 29, 2010); CERD 
REPORT 2010, supra note 203; Watson, supra note 143; Vivian, supra note 19; HREOC Submission 2010, 
supra note 231; CGA, Official Committee Hansard, Community Affairs Legislation Committee, Reference: 
Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of Racial 
Discrimination Act) Bill 2009 (Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commtte
e/S12774.pdf [sic], (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Committee Hansard 2010]. 
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amendments are adequate to ameliorate the serious negative effects of “felt” 
discrimination and stigma subjectively experienced by Aboriginal people in 
NT since the Intervention was launched.233  
In its defense, Australia consistently asserted that the measures taken 
were necessary to ensure that indigenous people in NT enjoyed their rights 
on an equal footing with other Australians, and were therefore justified by 
the doctrine of special measures.234  Given the prima facie discriminatory 
nature of these measures, even after the 2010 amendments, that assertion 
demands scrutiny. 
3. The Role of “Special Measures” 
It is well established that formal equality in law is insufficient to 
guarantee actual freedom from discrimination.235  As Martínez-Cobo put it, 
notwithstanding de jure equality and the widespread condemnation of 
discrimination, de facto discrimination against indigenous peoples continues 
around the world. 236   Berhendt argues that in Australia, formal equality 
offers false promises and has actually allowed indigenous socioeconomic 
disadvantage to continue.237   
To counteract this reality, special measures may be required for 
indigenous peoples to exercise their rights fully and equally with the rest of 
the population.238  Article 1.4 ICERD, which is incorporated into Australian 
federal law through section 8(1) of the RDA, provides that: 
                                                      
233  Committee Hansard 2010, supra note 232; Schokman, supra note 179; Billings, supra note 141 
and 166; Martiniello, supra note 2; Howard-Wagner, supra note 2; REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24; 
Innes, supra note 205; Equality Rights Alliance, Women’s Experience of Income Management in the 
Northern Territory (2011), available at http://www.equalityrightsalliance.org.au/sites/equalityrightsalliance
.org.au/files/docs/readings/income_management_report_v1-4_0.pdf.   
234  See, e.g., NTERB Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16; Special Rapporteur, S. James Anaya, 
Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies received, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/9/Add.1 12-14 
(Aug. 15, 2008), 12-14; CGA, House of Representatives, Social Security and Other Legislation 
Amendment (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of Racial Discrimination Act) Bill 2009 (Cth) 
Explanatory Memorandum, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/ssaolararordab2009
984/memo_0.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinafter “WRRRDA Explanatory Memorandum”]. 
235  Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64, at 19 (Apr. 6); 
South West Africa Cases, supra note 193, at para. 305-306, per Tanaka J (dissent); Maya (Toledo) v. 
Belize, supra note 44, at para. 162, 169; Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11, para. 25 per Brennan J 
(Austl.); YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 130; Endorois v. Kenya, supra note 130; HRC, CCPR 
General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, 146. (Nov. 10, 1989).  See 
also, ILO Convention 169, art. 6(1)(b) 
236  Special Rapporteur, Study on the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations: 
Final Report, Part I, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/Add.3 (June 26, 1981) (by José Martínez-Cobo). 
237  Larissa Behrendt, Indigenous Self-Determination: Rethinking the Relationship Between Rights and 
Economic Development, 24 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 850, para. 16-17 (2001).   
238  HRC, General Comment No. 23, supra note 78, para. 6.2, 7; Endorois v. Kenya, supra note 130, at 
para. 196; Maya (Toledo) v. Belize, supra note 44, at para. 96. 
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Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing 
adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or 
individuals requiring such protection . . . shall not be deemed 
racial discrimination. 
The serious socio-economic problems affecting indigenous 
Australians in NT mean special measures are not only justified but urgently 
required.239  States parties to ICERD are obliged to take affirmative action to 
ensure the adequate development and protection of indigenous peoples 
where necessary for the purpose of guaranteeing full enjoyment of their 
rights.240  Article 21(2) of UNDRIP further provides that states shall take 
special measures where necessary to ensure ongoing improvement in living 
conditions.  However, Australia’s characterization of the Intervention 
provisions as special measures 241  does not satisfy the established 
international interpretation.242  
Many have observed that if Australia believed NTER amounted to 
special measures, there would have been no need to suspend the RDA in the 
first place, because Section 8(1) expressly allows special measures as a 
legitimate exception to the prohibition against racial discrimination.243  The 
federal government acknowledged this inconsistency in taking steps partially 
to reinstate the RDA, but continued to rely on special measures as 
justification for NTER244–which in turn supports the conclusion that NTER 
continued to be characterized by distinctions made on the basis of race, 
despite the amendments.  An important question is whether provisions that 
negatively affect the target group can qualify as special measures.   
                                                      
239  ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, at Appendix B, para. 3.  
240 ICERD, art. 2(2); Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, supra note 193, at para. 104. 
241  NTERA, s133(1).  
242  See, e.g., ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38; CERD REPORT 2010, supra note 203; HREOC 
SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2007, supra note 164; Vivian, supra note 19; Hunyor, supra note 158; Amnesty 
International, supra note 19; Billings, supra notes 141 and 166; Chesterman & Douglas, supra note 2; 
Nicholson et al., supra note 19. 
243  See, e.g., submissions 97 (Australian Council of Social Service) and 52 (Law Council of 
Australia) to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (2007), available at http://www.aph. 
gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-07/nt_emergency/submissions/sublist.htm, 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2011); Watson, supra note 143.  One exception is s10(3) RDA , which excludes from 
“special measures” provisions taking control of Aboriginal land.  This would affect some aspects of NTER, 
e.g, compulsory leases. 
244  E.g., CGA, Future Directions for the Northern Territory Emergency Response – Discussion Paper 
(2009), available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/nter_reports/future_directions_discussio
n_paper/Pages/default.aspx, last accessed 6 April 2011; WRRRDA Explanatory Memorandum, above n 
234.  The special measures justification is continued in the new legislation: see Stronger Futures in the 
Northern Territory Act 2012 (Cth), ss 7, 33, 37; CGA, House of Representatives, Stronger Futures in the 
Northern Territory Bill (Cth) Explanatory Memorandum, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/legis/cth/bill_em/sfitntb2011536/memo_0.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=stronger%2
0futures, (last accessed Jan. 22, 2012).   
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Internationally, the position is unambiguous.  The language of ICERD 
and UNDRIP implies preferential treatment of the targeted group, not 
treatment that limits or infringes rights.245  ILO Convention 169 puts this 
beyond doubt in the indigenous context,246 providing that special measures 
shall not be contrary to the freely-expressed wishes of the peoples 
concerned, and that special measures shall not prejudice the enjoyment, 
without discrimination, of other rights.247 
In Australia, however, the question is not settled.248  Differences in 
judicial interpretation 249  have blurred the boundaries between positive 
measures that benefit disadvantaged groups, and measures that take benefits 
away because it is “good for them.”250  This shift seems to indicate a return 
to paternalistic notions familiar to indigenous Australians, 251  and raises 
concerns that Australia’s use of special measures might harm rather than 
benefit the most vulnerable groups.  From an international legal perspective, 
Australia is bound to give effect to the prevailing interpretation under 
international law; domestic law cannot be an excuse for violating 
international obligations.252  
The CERD has clarified the test for special measures as follows:  
Special measures should be appropriate to the situation to be 
remedied, be legitimate, necessary in a democratic society, 
respect the principles of fairness and proportionality, and be 
temporary.  ... States parties should ensure that special measures 
are designed and implemented on the basis of prior consultation 
                                                      
245  ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38. 
246  Australia has not ratified ILO Convention 169, but see supra, note 29.   
247  ILO Convention 169, art. 4(3). 
248  Vivian, supra note 19; Hunyor, supra note 158; HREOC Social Justice Report 2007, supra  
note 164.  
249  See, e.g., Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11 (Austl.); Vanstone v Clark (2005) 147 FCR 299 
(Austl.); Bropho v WA [2007] FCA 519 (Austl.); Bropho v WA [2008] FCAFC 100 (Austl.); Aurukun 
Shire Council and Anor v CEO Office of Liquor Gaming and Racing in the Department of Treasury [2010] 
QCA 37 (Austl.); Morton v Queensland Police Service [2010] QCA 160 (Austl.); Maloney v Queensland 
Police Service [2011] QDC 139 (Austl.). 
250  See Hunyor, supra note 158, at 63.  
251  See, e.g., HREOC, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE SEPARATION OF ABORIGINAL 
AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER CHILDREN FROM THEIR FAMILIES, BRINGING THEM HOME (1997), available 
at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/pdf/social_justice /bringing_them_home_report.pdfa; Billings, supra note 166, 
at 181-82; Dodson & Strelein, supra note 2; Sutton, supra note 166; Anthony, supra note 166; Cobb, supra 
note 30; Billings, supra note 141; Megan Davis, A Culture of Disrespect: Indigenous Peoples and 
Australian Public Institutions, 8 U. TECH. SYDNEY L. REV. 135 (2006). 
252  This principle is enshrined in VCLT, art 27, and the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art 32, and it is an established rule of customary law: Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, para. 121; See also ANAYA REPORT 
2010, supra note 38, at Appendix B, para. 20.   
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with affected communities and the active participation of such 
communities.253 
Taking “the situation to be remedied” in CERD’s test to be “the child 
abuse problem in Aboriginal communities” as the primary trigger for the 
Intervention, it is difficult to see how measures like blanket income 
management were appropriate, legitimate, and necessary remedies.254  The 
objective of child protection is certainly worthy, but the relationship between 
the objective and the approach was so tenuous as to lead to skepticism about 
the motivations behind NTER.255 
As for fairness and proportionality, income management was applied 
compulsorily, with no right of external review, on the basis of physical 
presence in certain areas distinguished by race–not on the basis of, for 
example, a given welfare recipient’s personal decision to participate 
voluntarily in income management, or a proven inability to manage his or 
her finances coupled with a request for assistance, or a demonstrated 
problem of child abuse, neglect, alcoholism or gambling in any individual 
case.  Although the 2009 and 2010 amendments made some attempt to 
change this, by removing references to race and providing for appeals and 
exemptions, it is still the case that the income management regime continues 
disproportionately to target Aboriginal people.256   
The blanket income management system represents discrimination 
that is indiscriminate: it contravenes Article 9 of UNDRIP, discriminating 
against individuals within the group based on racist generalizations about the 
group as a whole.  It has been described as equating Aboriginality with a 
lack of capacity and assuming that all Aboriginal people are irresponsible, 
“feckless squanderers.”257  This stigmatization arguably violates Article 15 
of UNDRIP.  It contributes to a focus on the “unworthiness” of the people 
being targeted, instead of the problems to be addressed.258 
Thus NTER income management measures did not respect the 
principles of fairness or proportionality in terms of the CERD requirements.  
                                                      
253  Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD], General Recommendation No 
XXXII, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/32, para. 16, 18 (Sept. 24, 2009). 
254  See discussion in Anaya Report 2010, supra note 38; Hunyor, supra note 158. 
255  See, e.g., Martiniello, supra note 2; Howard-Wagner, supra note 2; SENATE COMM. REPORT 2007, 
supra note 9, at 49-60, 51 (Andrew Bartlett, Queensland Democrat, Senator, minority report); Watson, 
supra note 143; Billings, supra note 166; Melinda Hinkson, Introduction: In the Name of the Child, in 
Altman & Hinkson (eds.), supra note 162, at 1-12; Pat Turner & Nicole Watson, The Trojan Horse, in 
Altman & Hinkson (eds.), supra note 162, at 205-12. 
256 ALASTAIR NICHOLSON ET AL., LISTENING BUT NOT HEARING: A RESPONSE TO NTER STRONGER 
FUTURES CONSULTATIONS JUNE TO AUGUST 2011, 8 (2011).  
257 Sutton, supra note 166.  See also Billings, supra note 141; Anthony, supra note 166.  
258  Chesterman & Douglas, supra note 2, at 82; Billings, supra note 141, at 37. 
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Nor can the measures be described as temporary; the initial twelve-month 
period of compulsory income management was extended, despite the lack of 
clear evidence on whether it was meeting its objectives,259 and despite the 
recommendations of NTER Review Board.260  Income management has now 
been extended yet again, although in modified form, in connection with the 
Stronger Futures package. 261   As for consultation and participation, 
identified as crucial in the CERD test,262 the discussion above has shown 
that no efforts were made to consult with Aboriginal peoples about NTER 
before it was launched, and consultations about the redesign took place after 
the government had already decided to continue and extend income 
management.   
The effect on those outside the affected group is another relevant 
factor in assessing special measures. 263   This is related to the temporal 
criterion: special measures must not be allowed to create unfair 
discrimination against those outside the group receiving preferential 
treatment.264  In NTER context, however, the effect was the opposite–those 
outside the group receiving ‘preferential’ treatment did not want to be a part 
of it.  Representatives of the refugee community expressed grave concern at 
the possibility that newly-arrived refugees would fall within the income 
management regime following the 2010 amendments broadening its 
scope. 265   The fact that the special treatment is not desirable to people 
outside the affected group reinforces the argument that these were not 
special measures within the ordinary use of the term. 
In summary, Australia’s reliance on “special measures” to justify the 
racial distinction in NTER was not valid under international law. 266  
                                                      
259  See CIRCA REPORT 2009, supra note 183; AUS. INST. OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, REPORT ON THE 
EVALUATION OF INCOME MANAGEMENT IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY (2009), available at 
http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/about/publicationsarticles/research/occasional/Documents/op34/OP34.pdf 
[hereinafter AIHW REPORT]; HREOC Submission 2010, supra note 231. 
260  REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24. 
261  Social Security Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) (Austl.).  A proposal to delete the schedule 
failed.  See Stronger Futures Senate Hansard 2012, supra note 183, at 109-16. 
262  See also Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11 (Austl.); Hunyor, supra note 158.  
263  See Gillian Triggs, The Rights of Peoples and Individual Rights: Conflict or Harmony?, in 
Brownlie, supra note 1, at 141-57. 
264  Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11, para. 38 (per Brennan J) (Austl.).  
265  See supra, entire note 231; Refugee Council of Australia, Letter to Dr. Jeff Harmer, Secretary, 
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services, and Indigenous Affairs (“FAHCSIA”) (Sept. 7, 
2010), available at http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/docs/89current/100907_FAHCSIA_income_ mgt.pdf. 
266  It is unlikely to be challenged domestically, however, given the obstacles, especially, for example, 
especially Judge Kirby’s dissent.  See Wurridjal v Australia [2009] HCA 2,); McIntyre, supra note 159; 
Hilary Charlesworth, The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2004 Term, 28 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 1, 
2 (2005).  See also Steiner, Alston & Goodman, supra note 193, 913-14 (on Australia’s indifference to 
HRC recommendations following individual complaints under the ICCPR Protocol I process). 
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Amnesty International described it as a travesty that demeans the concept for 
short-term political gain. 267   The example of compulsory income 
management does not satisfy the CERD requirements, and there is not 
enough concrete evidence to say it is ensuring ongoing improvement in 
living conditions, in terms of Article 21(2) of UNDRIP.268   
Australia’s assertion that the Intervention could be justified on the 
grounds of “legitimate differential treatment” that does not need to meet the 
special measures test was equally dubious. 269   As a general principle, 
treatment that limits rights is only ever justified if it is proportionate to and 
necessary for the achievement of a legitimate aim; 270  it must have a 
reasonable and objective justification, and remain consistent with other 
rights.271  NTER failed on all counts.272   
In launching the Intervention, Australia failed to implement the 
standards of non-discrimination that are recognized in UNDRIP as integral 
to indigenous peoples’ enjoyment of their rights.  Instead of adopting a 
progressive model of equality, partnership, and respect in tackling the 
problem of indigenous disadvantage, as urged by Little Children Are Sacred, 
NTER reflects paternalistic attitudes reminiscent of the colonial era.  This 
initial approach has been severely detrimental to the ongoing success of the 
Intervention measures, despite attempts to improve it since 2007.  
The right to freedom from discrimination, the first essential 
foundation for self-determination, was wholly lacking.  The next section will 
examine the second foundation: the right to meaningful participation in 
decision-making. 
                                                      
267  Amnesty International, supra note 19. 
268  THE AIHW REPORT, supra entire note 259, and NTER Evaluation Report 2011 provided evidence 
to suggest that income management was having positive results for a number of participants, but 
acknowledged that several limitations in the research such as small sample sizes, nature of the surveys 
undertaken, and the lack of a comparison group or historical data meant that the overall evidence of 
effectiveness was not strong.  For corroboration of the claim that there is inadequate reliable data on 
whether or not income management is effective for achieving its stated goals, see Luke Buckmaster & 
Carol Ey, Is income management working? (Parliament of Australia, Background Note, June 5, 2012), 
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_ 
Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2011-2012/IncomeManagement (last visited July 8, 2012).  
269  ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, at Appendix B, para. 55.  
270  Handyside v. U.K., 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 737 (ECHR) (1976); Endorois v. Kenya, supra note 130, at 
para. 214.  
271  Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, HRC, UN Doc A/36/40 para. 15 (1981); Dann v. United States, supra 
note 44. 
272  Vivian, supra note 19.  
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C. The Right to Participation 
1. International Law 
Indigenous peoples’ right to participation is a core principle and right 
under international human rights law.273  In 1997, CERD urged states to 
“ensure that members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of 
effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to 
their rights and interests are taken without their informed consent.”274   
The right to participation is emphasized repeatedly in UNDRIP, as 
discussed above in the analysis of the meaning of self-determination.  
Articles 3-5, 18, 19 and 23 are of particular importance.  Promoting full and 
effective participation by indigenous peoples is one of the goals in the 
program of action for the Second Decade of the World’s Indigenous People 
(2005-2015),275 and the principles of participation and consultation underpin 
the recommendations of each session of the United Nations Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues (“UNPFII”).276   
At the international level, the inclusive procedure adopted by the 
relevant UN bodies during the drafting of UNDRIP recognized the 
importance of involving indigenous peoples themselves in creating the 
regime that is being developed to protect their rights and interests.277  This 
shift away from the typically state-centered creation of international law has 
blazed the trail for significantly increased indigenous participation at the 
international level.278  The formation, composition and ongoing mandate of 
UNPFII will help ensure that that participation continues.279  In Tennant’s 
words, “participation is now the hinge on which the whole political field of 
indigenous peoples and international institutions turns.”280  
                                                      
273  Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Progress Report on the Study on 
Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-Making, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/EMRIP/2010/2 
(May 17, 2010) [hereinafter EMRIP Report]. 
274  CERD, General Recommendation No XXIII on Indigenous Peoples (Aug. 18, 1997), U.N. Doc. 
A/52/18, Annex V, para. 4(d).  See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 23, supra note 78, 
at para. 7. 
275  U.S. General Assembly, Draft Programme of Action for the Second International Decade of the 
World’s Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. A/60/270 (Aug. 18, 2005). 
276  See UNPFII, ENGAGING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN GOVERNANCE PROCESSES: INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT (Aug. 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/ documents/engagement_background_en.pdf, para. 11. 
277  See, e.g., Daes, supra note 33; Eide, supra note 4. 
278  See UNDRIP, art. 41; Lindroth, supra note 39, at 242; Daes, supra note 33, at 10; U.N. Inter-
Agency Support Group on Indigenous Issues, UN Development Group Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ 
Issues (2009), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/ UNDG_guidelines_EN.pdf 
[hereinafter UNDG Guidelines].  Compare Otto, supra note 2, at 102.  
279  See Lindroth, supra note 39.  
280 Tennant, supra note 10, at 4 (although he warns against treating institutional participation as an 
end in itself). 
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At the national level, UNDRIP distinguishes between state-wide 
“external” participation and local “internal” participation. 281   External 
participation reflects the right to participation in the conduct of public affairs 
enshrined in Article 25 of ICCPR,282 often described as a right to political 
participation, which is arguably emerging as a norm of customary law.283  It 
is significant that UNDRIP specifically recognizes political participation as a 
group right, capable of exercise by indigenous peoples collectively,284 where 
previously it was only recognized as an individual right.285  Accordingly, 
there will be a need to strengthen indigenous peoples’ own representative 
institutions.286   
It need hardly be reiterated that rights of external, political 
participation–including the right to vote and the emerging right to 
democratic governance–are a vital component of self-determination for any 
people.  But internal participation is the “extra dimension” of participation 
that provides the essential element of empowerment in UNDRIP: 
meaningful participation in decision-making about indigenous peoples’ local 
affairs and interests.287  The right to participation embodied in UNDRIP is 
broader than simply political participation, requiring both the internal and 
external elements of participation combined, as fundamental prerequisites 
for self-determination.288   
Three points support this argument.  First, confining the label of 
participation to political concepts pushes indigenous peoples towards 
traditionally Western decision-making processes and institutions, and thus 
                                                      
281  EMRIP Report, supra note 273, at 3. 
282  UNDRIP art. 5; UDHR art. 21; ILO Convention 169 arts. 6, 7. 
283  See, e.g., Gregory Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 539 (1992); Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46 
(1992); Maia Campbell, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Political Participation and the Case of 
YATAMA v. Nicaragua, 24 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 499 (2007). 
284  UNDRIP, art. 5. 
285 Marshall v. Canada, HRC, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/205/l986 (1991); Diergaardt v Namibia, para. 
10.8 (compare the separate opinion by Judge Scheinin).   
286  XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 111; Tennant, supra note 10. 
287  The word “meaningful” does not appear in UNDRIP, nor does “effective,” but the notion is 
implicit in the context of UNDRIP–otherwise participation could be reduced to token consultations.  This 
argument is supported by the Declaration on the Right to Development art. 2(3) G.A. Res. 41/128 (Dec. 28, 
1986);Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic 
Minorities art. 2 G.A. Res. 47/135 (Dec. 8, 1992), art. 2; General Comment No 23, supra note 78; Endorois 
v. Kenya, supra note 130, at paras. 281-283; YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 130, at para. 225; 
Saramaka v. Suriname, supra note 130, paras. 129, 147.  See also Myntti, supra note 35, at 122-130. 
288  The rights in Article 25 of the ICCPR are related to but distinct from self-determination.  HRC, 
General Comment No 25: Article 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) 167, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (1996). 
MARCH 2013 UNDRIP AND THE INTERVENTION  293 
 
reduces the empowerment to participate as they see fit, including through 
their own institutions and structures of governance.289   
Second, focusing solely on the political sphere sidelines non-political 
decision-making processes that may be important for indigenous peoples, for 
example, when exercising their socio-economic and cultural rights under 
UNDRIP.  Such decisions need to be made at the most local level possible in 
order to be effective.290  The interpretation of the right to participation as an 
integral part of self-determination needs to be broad enough to encompass 
decision-making in all spheres of public life, not just political decisions.291 
Third, if expressed solely in political terms, the right to participation 
loses much of its value and power for indigenous peoples.  Individual 
indigenous persons are guaranteed participation in political processes by 
Article 25 of ICCPR.  However, it is clear from the statistics and 
jurisprudence that indigenous peoples in many states with functioning 
democracies and ostensibly representative governments, including Australia, 
do not always enjoy any effective right of participation in the decisions that 
affect their lives. 292   UNDRIP recognizes that a more direct level of 
participation is required, in a way that is meaningful for indigenous peoples, 
if they are to have an effective role in controlling their futures.293  This is an 
area where special measures may be necessary.294 
At its lowest level, the right to participation in decision-making 
corresponds to a basic duty on states to consult with indigenous peoples 
before making decisions about issues that affect their interests.295  States 
parties to ILO Convention 169 are already bound by this duty,296 and the ILA 
has described it as a rule of customary law.297  Regional jurisprudence shows 
                                                      
289  YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 130; Mary Ellen Turpel, Indigenous Peoples' Rights of 
Political Participation and Self-Determination: Recent International Legal Developments and the 
Continuing Struggle for Recognition, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 579 (1992).   
290  Anaya (1993), supra note 35, at 152. 
291  This argument is supported by the Nuuk Conclusions and Recommendations on Indigenous 
Autonomy and Self-Government (1991), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/42. 
292  Martínez-Cobo Report 1983, supra note 37; EMRIP Report, supra note 273; Saramaka v. 
Suriname, supra note 130; Endorois v. Kenya, supra note 130; Maya (Toledo) v. Belize, supra note 44; 
Diergaardt v Namibia, No. 760/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997 (2000) (Judge Scheinin 
concurring). 
293  YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 130, at para. 201, 207; id. at para. 30-31 (García-Ramírez 
concurrence); EMRIP Report, supra note 273, at para. 12; HRC, General Comment No. 23, supra note 77, 
at para. 7.  
294  Quane, supra note 31, at 283; Campbell, supra note 283; Turpel, supra note 289.  
295  See, e.g., UNDRIP at arts. 15(2), 17(2), 30, 36, 38; CERD, General Recommendation No XXIII, 
supra note 274; Martínez-Cobo Report 1983, supra note 37; Saramaka v. Suriname, supra note 130; Dann 
v. United States, supra note 44.    
296  International Labor Organization (“ILO”), Convention No. 169 art. 6(2) (1989). 
297  International Law Association Report, supra note 3, at 852. 
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that it requires good faith negotiations, through culturally appropriate 
procedures, with the object of achieving agreement. 298   This objective 
matches the higher standard expressed in some of UNDRIP’s provisions.299  
The threshold is one of constant two-way communication from an early 
stage in the planning of any initiative.300  The duty is not discharged merely 
by presenting information once the decision has been made,301  or when 
approval is required.302  In some circumstances, the duty of consultation will 
not be discharged unless there is actual consent.303  
At its highest level (short of full secession and independence), the 
right to participation amounts to internal autonomy or self-government as 
provided in Article 4 of UNDRIP.304  However, that option is unlikely to be 
feasible or desirable for all indigenous peoples, particularly small 
communities without the resources, infrastructure and population to sustain 
it 305–and even for those that do have the potential for full autonomous 
government, it will take time to develop that capacity.  Meaningful 
participation in decision-making is the first essential step towards that end, if 
that is the goal; otherwise, it is an empowering goal in itself.     
Thus an expansive interpretation of the concept of participation 
underpinning self-determination sees bare consultation and full autonomy as 
different points along a continuum.  The right necessarily involves a choice 
for indigenous peoples about the desired form and degree of participation 
along that scale.306  Of course, indigenous peoples’ right to participation is 
not absolute.  It is clear it will be tempered by other practical and political 
considerations within the state, not least of which will be the rights of other 
                                                      
298  Maya (Toledo) v Belize, supra note 44; Saramaka v. Suriname supra note 130; Endorois v Kenya, 
supra note 130, at para. 289; Dann v. United States, supra note 44, at para. 165.  See Nuclear Tests 
(Australia v. France) 1974 I.C.J. 268, para. 46 (Dec. 20) and Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) 1974 
I.C.J. 473, para. 49 (Dec. 20) (stating the customary law principle of good faith (reflected in article 26 of 
VCLT) is “[o]ne of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, 
whatever their source”).  See also Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 
April 20, 2010, paras. 145-46. 
299  See, e.g., UNDRIP at arts. 19, 32. 
300  Saramaka v. Suriname, supra note 130; Endorois v. Kenya, supra note 130, at para. 289.  
301  Dann v. United States, supra note 44, at para. 281; Wurridjal v Australia, [2009] HCA 2 (per 
Judge Kirby’s dissent). 
302  Saramaka v. Suriname, supra note 130, at para. 133. 
303  Id., at para. 134; UNDRIP arts. 10, 29.   
304  For a typology of UNDRIP’s provisions on participation, see Quane, supra note 31, at 275-84. [ 
305  Eide, supra note 4, at 199. 
306  MARTÍNEZ-COBO REPORT 1983, supra note 38. 
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citizens and groups, 307  and may be subject to reasonable restrictions 
according to the usual standards for any limitation on rights.308   
The important point is that UNDRIP recognizes that bare political or 
“external” participation has not been enough to ensure the full enjoyment by 
indigenous peoples of all their rights.  The extra element of “internal” 
participation is also required, and it is these two forms of participation in 
combination that join with non-discrimination to create the foundations of 
indigenous self-determination.   
2. Participation in NTER 
The very language of the Intervention signals that it was imposed 
from outside, rather than having its genesis within the communities it 
purported to serve.  Despite the clear exhortations of Little Children Are 
Sacred, there was no process of consultation at all before the Intervention 
was launched–in some cases there was not even time for notification before 
police and military began arriving in the communities.309  Nearly 500 pages 
of draft legislation were rushed through Parliament with such haste that there 
was no time for genuine public debate.310  Instead, Aboriginal peoples in NT 
were simply presented with a “legislative fait accompli.”311   
It is obvious from Little Children Are Sacred that the Board saw 
empowerment and participation as the way forward for indigenous 
communities in NT,312 and that community members consulted by the Board 
strongly supported the methods that they used.313  The emphasis by both 
sides on the need for genuine consultation and engagement mirrors the 
message from the international community at the time, with UNDRIP 
adopted by the G.A. just a month after NTER was launched.   
However, Australia prioritized urgency at the expense of all else, 
arguing that “action cannot be delayed by concerns that it is ‘culturally 
                                                      
307  See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 2; Kingsbury, supra note 79; Vivian, supra note 19; Quane, supra 
note 31. 
308  Mahuika v. New Zealand, supra note 70; Marshall v. Canada Tribunal, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/43/D/205/l986 (Dec. 3, 1991), at para. 5.4-5.5.   
309  Vivian, supra note 70, at 13. 
310  Numerous individuals and organizations expressed serious concern about this (and many other 
aspects of the Intervention) to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee.  See 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-07/nt_emergency/sub 
missions/sublist.htm; Committee Hansard 2007, supra note 160; Bartlett, supra note 255.  See also 
COERCIVE RECONCILIATION, supra note 162. 
311  Wurridjal v Australia [2009] HCA 2, at para. 234 (per Judge Kirby’s dissent). 
312  See Little Children Are Sacred, supra note 14, at 52 (yet even the report’s authors were not 
consulted before the Intervention legislation was drafted).  See Committee Hansard 2007, supra note 160, 
at 13. 
313  The report quotes one Warlpiri elder as saying “We never have meetings like this.  If we have 
more meetings like this we will have more answers.” Little Children Are Sacred, supra note 14, at 52. 
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inappropriate.’”314  The language of “crisis” and “emergency” assisted to 
stifle debate and prevent scrutiny of the proposed measures, with those 
arguing for more careful consideration branded as tolerating child abuse.315  
The sudden, non-consultative manner of implementing a large number of 
major changes at once, and strong negative reactions to compulsory income 
management in particular, have contributed to a generalized and ongoing 
lack of engagement with measures which might otherwise have been well 
received.316  NTER approach undermined its own effectiveness from the 
outset by generating a widespread sense of betrayal, anger and loss of trust 
in the communities it purported to serve.317  
The complete lack of consultation before the Intervention was 
launched violated the standards of internal participation enshrined in 
UNDRIP, including in Articles 18,318 19,319 and 23.320  
Following severe criticism about the lack of participation,321 Australia 
acknowledged that consultations had been deficient, and from June to 
August 2009 it undertook a wide-reaching program of consultations on the 
“redesign” of the key NTER measures.322  This was undoubtedly a step in 
                                                      
314  Howard, supra note 159. 
315  See generally Bartlett, supra note 255; Howard-Wagner, supra note 2; Billings, supra note 141; 
Boyd Hunter, Conspicuous Compassion and Wicked Problems: The Howard Government’s National 
Emergency in Indigenous Affairs, 14 AGENDA 35 (2007); Raimond Gaita, The Moral Force of 
Reconciliation, in COERCIVE RECONCILIATION, supra note 162, at 295-306.  
316  NTER Evaluation Report 2011, supra note 171, at 5, 11-14, 363.  
317  REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24, at 8. 
318 UNDRIP art. 18 provides: “Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in 
matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with 
their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making 
institutions.” 
319 Id. at art. 19 (providing:  “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and 
informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect 
them.”). 
320 Id. at art. 23 (providing:  “Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities 
and strategies for exercising their right to development.  In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to 
be actively involved in developing and determining health, housing and other economic and social 
programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to administer such programmes through their own 
institutions.”). 
321  See, e.g., HREOC SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2007, supra note 164; REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra 
note 24; ANAYA REPORT 2008, supra note 30; Special Rapporteur Anaya, Summary of Cases Transmitted 
to Governments and Replies Received, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/9/Add.1 (Aug. 15, 2008); ICERD Request, 
supra note 176; CERD Urgent Actions Letters, supra note 203; CIRCA REPORT 2009, supra note 183; 
AIHW REPORT, supra note 259. 
322  See Future Directions, supra note 244; CGA, Policy Statement: Landmark Reform to the Welfare 
System, Reinstatement of the Racial Discrimination Act, and Strengthening of the Northern Territory 
Emergency Response (November 2009), available at http://www.fahcsia. gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/ 
nter_reports/policy_state ment_nter/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) [hereinafter CGA Policy 
Statement]; CGA, REPORT ON NTER REDESIGN CONSULTATIONS (2009), available at 
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the right direction, but the consultation efforts have been criticized for 
having a predetermined outcome,323 failing to involve Aboriginal people in 
the design and implementation of the consultations themselves, and failing 
adequately to explain complex legal concepts or use interpreters.324  The 
2009 consultations were aimed at defining provisions more clearly as special 
measures, rather than ensuring they were not racially discriminatory. 325  
They sought to maintain and strengthen core NTER measures, for example 
compulsory income management, despite calls for it to be abolished, or at 
least significantly amended so that it only applied to voluntary participants 
or those with a genuine need for assistance identified by their community.326  
All of this suggests the consultations did not meet the basic criteria for the 
duty to consult outlined above.  The process was more about obtaining some 
measure of community approval of decisions that had already been made, 
instead of being genuinely directed towards achieving agreement with 
indigenous peoples, as a two-way process of good faith, about how to 
develop measures that would affect their ongoing rights.  
The Select Committee on Regional and Remote Indigenous 
Communities, appointed to evaluate the effectiveness of NTER measures 
between 2008-2010, reported in 2009 that it had not received any evidence 
to indicate the experience of people in NTER communities had improved in 
terms of consultation and engagement, and observed that the federal 
government’s report on the adequacy of the consultations was contradicted 
by the independent report named Will They Be Heard? that was launched the 
same day.327  Research on “engagement” included as part of the 2011 NTER 
Evaluation Report highlighted serious deficiencies in important areas related 
to participation in decision-making, including inadequate use of interpreters, 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/nter_reports/Pages/report_nter_redesign_ 
consultations.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) [hereinafter CGA 2009 REPORT]. 
323  For example, the government had already decided to keep the compulsory income management 
regime: the only alternative open for discussion was whether to incorporate mechanisms for people to 
prove they deserved an exemption.  
324  Nicholson et al., supra note 19; CIRCA REPORT 2009, supra note 183; Nicholson, supra note 232; 
Vivian, supra note 19; McIntyre, supra note 159, at 109.  Besides the provisions on participation, the 
failure to use interpreters also breaches UNDRIP, art. 13(2). 
325  AUSTRALIAN AND NORTHERN TERRITORY GOVERNMENTS, RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF NTER 
REVIEW BOARD (2008), available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/nter_reports/ 
response_to_reportNT ER/Pages/default.aspx, (last visited Apr. 6, 2011); CGA Policy Statement, supra 
note 322; HREOC Submission 2010, supra note 231; WRRRDA Explanatory Memorandum, supra  
note 234. 
326  Nicholson et al., supra note 19 (providing the transcripts of consultations and discussions). 
327  CGA, THIRD REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL AND REMOTE INDIGENOUS 
COMMUNITIES (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/ 
Senate_Committees?url=indig_ctte/reports/index.htm (last visited July 8, 2012), para. 3.77.  See Nicholson 
et al., supra note 19 for the Will They Be Heard? Report. 
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failure to tailor engagement processes to local cultures, inadequate respect 
for the need for slower timeframes to allow for genuine consultation with 
communities, and a need to facilitate increased capacity for local governance 
by using existing structures within communities.328  At the other end of the 
spectrum, there is also evidence that in some cases communities have felt 
overwhelmed by too many consultations on certain issues, with high 
numbers of visits from government officials causing a burden to 
communities. 329   These failings point to an ongoing need for improved 
Aboriginal engagement and participation in the actual design and 
implementation of consultation processes, so that they are relevant, 
constructive, and meaningful.   
In summary, the level of indigenous participation in decision-making 
in NT during the Intervention fell well below the aspirations of consensus, 
cooperation, and consent in UNDRIP, with breaches of important provisions 
including Articles 18, 19, and 23.  The redesign consultations were an 
improvement on no consultations at all, but they did not live up to the 
standards embodied in UNDRIP and did little to provide Aboriginal people 
with meaningful opportunities to participate in decisions affecting their 
rights.  The focus here is on evolving standards of so-called internal 
participation, not voting rights,330 but it is arguable that even the established 
ICCPR right to political participation has had no true effect for those 
targeted by the Intervention–their voices were not heard.   
Any possibility of autonomy and self-government was completely out 
of the question under the paternalistic approach taken in NTER.  The initial 
absence of consultation and the flaws in the redesign process have 
undermined ongoing decision-making processes and local governance in 
communities, which perpetuates the popular stigmatization of Aboriginal 
people as unable to help themselves. 331   Although UNDRIP’s enhanced 
standards of internal participation may not yet be binding on Australia as a 
matter of international law,332 similar objectives are already recognized in 
                                                      
328  NTER EVALUATION REPORT 2011, supra note 171, at 136-140. 
329  Id. at 5, 17-18, 152-53. 
330  Even those voting rights which have come were received only relatively recently:  Aboriginal 
people did not have a universal right to vote until 1962, and voting was not compulsory (as for other 
Australians) until 1982–for a long time it was illegal to encourage Aboriginal people to vote.  See George 
Williams, Race and the Australian Constitution: From Federation to Reconciliation, 38 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 643, 651-52 (2000); Murphy, supra note 2. 
331  ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, at para. 59 and Appendix B, para. 3; Howard-Wagner, supra 
note 2; Still Paying the Price for Benign Intentions?, supra note 141; Social Welfare Experiments in 
Australia, supra note 166. 
332  Contrast ILA Report, supra note 3, at 852 for the view that the duty to consult is customary law. 
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Australian legislation, 333  and it should be recalled that CERD had been 
urging ICERD states parties to adhere to such standards for at least ten years 
before UNDRIP was adopted.334   
D. Conclusion 
Starting from the understanding that self-determination is about a 
people’s empowerment to control its own affairs, it is clear from the 
foregoing analysis that the original NTER violated the right to self-
determination recognized in UNDRIP by failing to uphold the basic norms 
that underpin it: meaningful participation in decision-making and the right to 
freedom from discrimination.335  It did not even measure up to the limited 
interpretation of self-determination that Australia endorsed when it 
announced its support for UNDRIP in 2009,336 let alone the high standard it 
supported during earlier phases of the UNDRIP drafting process.337  The 
Little Children Are Sacred report which triggered the Intervention identified 
the disempowerment of Aboriginal men and women as a matter requiring 
urgent attention,338  but Australia’s response to that report disempowered 
them further still. 
The Intervention was missing the crucial element of empowerment 
from its inception.  Attempts to patch it up through partial reinstatement of 
the RDA and flawed consultations on the redesign were inadequate to 
reverse that effect as NTER transitioned into the “development” phase 
                                                      
333  The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 (Cth), s 3 provides:  
 
The objects of this Act are, in recognition of the past dispossession and dispersal of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and their present disadvantaged position in 
Australian society: 
 
(a)  to ensure maximum participation of Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders in 
the formulation and implementation of government policies that affect them; 
(b)  to promote the development of self-management and self-sufficiency among 
Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders; 
(c)  to further the economic, social and cultural development of Aboriginal persons and 
Torres Strait Islanders; and 
(d)  to ensure co-ordination in the formulation and implementation of policies affecting 
Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders by the Commonwealth, State, Territory 
and local governments, without detracting from the responsibilities of State, Territory and 
local governments to provide services to their Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
residents. 
 
334 See supra, text accompanying note 274. 
335  ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, at para.16; McIntyre, supra note 159, at 109; CERD REPORT 
2010, supra note 203. 
336  Macklin, supra note 97. 
337  See, e.g., Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 93; Barsh, supra note 26; Sanders, supra 
note 125. 
338  Little Children Are Sacred, supra note 14, at 16. 
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administered under the Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory National 
Partnership Agreement (“NTNPA”).339  The declaration of an ‘emergency’ 
was decades overdue, and welcome for the reason that it triggered 
unprecedented investment in service provision and infrastructure for 
indigenous communities–but Australia crashed the ambulance.340  Even the 
Intervention’s strongest supporters could hardly argue that any gains have 
been made specifically because the government chose to take a 
discriminatory and paternalistic approach, and that such an approach was 
necessary for that progress to be realized; the evidence to the contrary, that 
the approach was severely detrimental to the success of individual measures, 
is far more compelling.     
 
IV. MOVING ON: STRONGER FUTURES? 
Where is all that self-determination, where has all that yäku 
(name) gone.  You can change names [to Stronger Futures] to 
convince [us that things are better] but you are still following 
the same [track].341 
It is one thing to pick apart the 2007 NTER as a clear failure to 
respect and foster indigenous self-determination, but it must be 
acknowledged that the Intervention has changed shape over its lifetime,342 
and the efforts to improve participation and reinstate the RDA, albeit far 
from perfect in their execution, represent a positive sign that Australia has 
attempted to respond to some of the criticism of its original methodology.  
The million-dollar–or rather, 3.4 billion dollar 343 –question is whether 
Australia has truly learned from the serious backlash provoked by NTER 
and is prepared to make genuine efforts to align ongoing policies and 
legislative processes with the spirit of empowerment in UNDRIP.   
With the commencement of the Stronger Futures consultations in June 
2011, there appeared to be cause for optimism.  It was another chance to 
start again.  Shifts in the language used by government as it has moved 
                                                      
339  For an outline of the transition, see NTER EVALUATION REPORT 2011, supra note 171, at 71-74. 
340  Kay Boulden & John Morton, Don’t Crash the Ambulance, in COERCIVE RECONCILIATION, supra 
note 162, at 163-170. 
341 Statement by Djuŋadjuŋa Yunupiŋu, Dalkarramirr for the Gumatj Nation, Apr. 24, 2012 (spoken 
in English and Yolŋu Matha and attached as Appendix 1 to Yolngu Nations Assembly), available at 
http://stoptheintervention.org/uploads/files_to_download/ Stronger-Futures/Yolngu-Statement-2-5-12.pdf. 
342 For a summary of how the welfare reforms have evolved over the life of NTER, see NTER 
EVALUATION REPORT 2011, supra note 171, at Appendix 9.A. 
343 This is the amount pledged for the Stronger Futures legislation (separate from income 
management) over the next ten years.  See Jenny Macklin MP, Press Conference, June 29, 2012, available 
at http://www.jennymacklin.fahcsia.gov.au/node/1977 (last visited 11 July 11, 2012). 
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beyond the emergency phase of NTER into the development phase under the 
NTNPA have suggested Australia is keen to “reset the relationship” with 
indigenous peoples, and that it recognizes the importance of improving its 
approach to engagement, collaboration and partnership.344  It is particularly 
significant that the Prime Minister has acknowledged the role that decades of 
under-investment in infrastructure and basic services for Aboriginal people 
have played in the entrenched disadvantage experienced today,345 and it is 
encouraging that both the federal and NT governments have committed to 
ongoing investment and funding for increased services in communities, 
including parenting support, financial literacy services, substance abuse 
prevention, health, and education services.   
The mere fact Australia was undertaking consultations on Stronger 
Futures was already a vast improvement on the early approach of NTER, 
and the large scale of the consultations (around 450 meetings across 100 
communities, town camps and major towns) suggested an admirable attempt 
to ascertain the views of a wide range of different people. 346   The 
government commissioned an independent monitor to report on whether or 
not consultations were conducted in accordance with the government’s 
consultation and communication strategies and were “open, fair and 
accountable.”  The report concluded that within its limited terms of 
reference those objectives had been satisfied, and that there were some 
practical improvements in the conduct of the meetings as compared to the 
2009 redesign consultations.347   
Despite these improvements, however, there remains serious cause for 
concern that the Stronger Futures consultations were inadequate, in terms of 
the standards set forth in UNDRIP.  Transcripts of the consultations 
themselves,348 numerous submissions to the Senate inquiry,349 speeches by 
                                                      
344 See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT: DEPT. OF FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES, & 
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, CLOSING THE GAP: ENGAGEMENT AND PARTNERSHIP WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, 
available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/our-responsibilities/indigenous-australians/programs-services/ 
closing-the-gap/closing-the-gap-engagement-and-partnership-with-indigenous-people (last visited July 8, 
2012); CGA, PRIME MINISTER’S REPORT, supra note 20; CGA, STRONGER FUTURES: POLICY STATEMENT, 
supra note 22.  See also Northern Territory Government, Submission No. 403 to the Senate Community 
Affairs Committee Inquiry into the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Bill 2011 and 
Two Related Bills, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Comm
ittees?url=clac_ctte/strong_future_nt_11/submissions.htm (last visited July 11, 2012). 
345 Closing the Gap: Prime Minister’s Report, supra note 20; see also Gaita, supra note 315. 
346 See Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Report on Consultations, supra note 22. 
347 CULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS RESEARCH CENTRE AUSTRALIA, Report on Stronger Futures 
Consultation 2011, 27 (2011), available at www.fahcsia.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/ 
circa_qa.pdf [hereinafter CIRCA Report 2011]. 
348For transcripts from a number of consultation meetings, see http://www.concernedaustralians.com.a
u/. 
302 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 22 NO. 2 
 
several senators at the second reading of the bills,350 and public responses 
both before and after the legislation was passed351 contradict the positive 
reports from the government, and indicate that there is a substantial amount 
of opposition to the new legislation.  Again, the point here is not to critique 
the content of the new policies, but to examine at this early stage whether the 
government’s methodology in developing and implementing Stronger 
Futures shows a move away from the mistakes of NTER.  
In terms of the quality of consultations, the government’s own review 
of NTER had acknowledged that “the timeframes imposed and the decision 
to consult after key decisions had already been taken were responsible for 
many of the problems in the early stages of NTER.”352  Yet these same 
criticisms, and many others that were familiar from the original NTER and 
the redesign consultations, have arisen again in respect of Stronger Futures–
that the consultations operated on “Canberra” timeframes, with inadequate 
involvement of Aboriginal people in the planning of consultations, little or 
no notice of meetings, and insufficient time for detailed deliberation; that 
significant measures like income management were not listed for discussion; 
that information about the proposed measures was densely worded and 
complex, and provided with insufficient time for communities to give it 
proper consideration before the consultations; that there was inadequate use 
of interpreters, including a lack of translation of lengthy written materials 
                                                                                                                                                              
349 The Committee received 452 submissions and form letters from approximately 560 individuals. 
Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Bill 2011 [Provisions]; Stronger Futures in the Northern 
Territory (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2011 [Provisions]; Social Security Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2011 [Provisions], SENATE COMMUNITY AFFAIRS LEGISLATION COMMITTEE 1 (Mar. 14, 
2012) available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/ Committees/Senate_Committees? 
url=clac_ctte/strong_future_nt_11/report/index.htm (last visited July 11, 2012).  The submissions are 
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=clac_ctte
/strong_future_nt_11/submissions.htm.   
350 Stronger Futures Senate Hansard 2012, supra note 183. 
351 See, e.g., Nicholson et al., supra note 256; Stronger Futures Forum Held at Maningrida on 21 
February 2012 (Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://vimeo.com/37790315 (last accessed July 6, 2012); 
Yolngu Nations Assembly, supra note 341; STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AUSTRALIA’S 
FIRST PEOPLES TO UNPFII (May 2012), http://nationalcongress.com.au/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/120514UNFinal-Statement.pdf (last visited July 12, 2012); THE STRONGER 
FUTURES LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE: ASSESSMENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, AUSTRALIAN 
LAWYERS’ ALLIANCE, June 29, 2012, http://lawyersalliance.com.au/media/File/2_ALA_Statement_of_Non
compliance.pdf [hereinafter “Stronger Futures Assessment”]; Aboriginal Leaders Declare Day of 
Mourning, THE AUSTRALIAN, June 27, 2012, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breaking-
news/aboriginal-leaders-declare-day-of-mourning/story-fn3dxity-1226409672043 (last visited July 12, 
2012); Stronger Futures Laws Condemned After Passing Senate, ABC NEWS, June 29, 2012, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-06-29/stronger-futures-laws-rushed-through-senate/4100288 (last visited 
July 12, 2012).  Various resources are also available at the website of the group Concerned Australians, 
http://www.concernedaustralians.com.au/. 
352 NTER EVALUATION REPORT 2011, supra note 171, at 41. 
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into Aboriginal languages; and that the sessions covered so many questions 
that there was no possibility of in depth discussion in the time available.353   
These concerns and the many strong negative responses to the content 
of the legislation itself 354  indicate that the standards of participation in 
decision-making and free, prior, informed consent in Articles 18 and 19 
UNDRIP have not been met; nor has the consultation process given adequate 
effect to the rights of Aboriginal people to be actively involved in the 
development and implementation of health, housing, economic and social 
programs, in connection with the exercise of their rights to development 
according to their own priorities (Article 23). 
The inadequacies in the consultation process have important 
implications for the government’s assertion that the key measures in the 
Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 amount to special 
measures. 355   As discussed above, special measures amount to “positive 
discrimination;” they are an exception to the definition of racial 
discrimination because they are taken for the sole purpose of advancing the 
rights of disadvantaged groups.  The special measures justification is not 
substantiated in detail in the government’s “Statement on compatibility with 
human rights” provided under the new Human Rights (Parliamentary 
Scrutiny) Act 2011.356  However, even without delving into an assessment of 
the substance of the legislation, the lack of adequate prior consultation is 
enough on its own to disqualify these measures as “special measures” in 
accordance with the established criteria under international law, 357  that 
essential prerequisite being even more important in circumstances where the 
measures appear to confer a negative effect rather than a benefit on the target 
group.   
If they are not genuine special measures, then it is clear that the 
Stronger Futures legislation is discriminatory, despite purporting not to 
“affect” the operation of RDA.358  It seems that the legislation still operates 
on racially discriminatory assumptions–one being that Aboriginal people 
                                                      
353 See Nicholson et al., supra note 256; HREOC Submission 2012, supra note 349; CIRCA REPORT 
2011, supra note 347. 
354 For numerous submissions to the Senate inquiry, see supra note 349. 
355 Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 (Cth), ss 7, 33, 37 (Austl.); Stronger Futures 
in the Northern Territory Bill (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/legis/cth/bill_em/sfitntb2011536/memo_0.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=stronger%2
0futures (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).  
356 See Stronger Futures Assessment, supra note 351 (responding to the government’s statement).  
357 For a more detailed analysis, see Nicholson et al., supra note 256, at 99-101, para. 242-47. 
358 Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 (Cth), s 4A (Austl.).  Whether or not this 
provision is strong enough to prevent the later act from prevailing over RDA in event of inconsistency 
remains to be seen.  See supra note 215.  
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need centralized government to make decisions for them about matters such 
as food choices and alcohol management, and another being that all 
Aboriginal cultures across the NT are the same and will benefit from the 
blanket imposition of a “one-size-fits-all” approach.  Both of these 
assumptions were challenged repeatedly during the consultation process, and 
it was clear that there is an ongoing perception that the legislation creates 
different rules for Aboriginal people as compared to other Australians.359 
In the context of the present discussion, the ongoing plans for 
extending compulsory income management across Australia are particularly 
troubling.  The evidence that compulsory income management is an 
effective means of addressing disadvantage is limited, with resulting positive 
changes reported as “uneven and fragile.” 360   Again, the 2011 NTER 
Evaluation had documented the wide-reaching feelings of loss of control and 
disempowerment that resulted from the imposition of compulsory income 
management, and advocated a new approach that would “encourage local 
Indigenous social and cultural ownership”361–yet the new legislation not 
only continues compulsory income management but extends it to new 
categories of people and broadens executive power to roll the regime out 
further to new communities across Australia.362  
At the time of writing it has only been a matter of days since the new 
legislation passed through the Senate, but there have been calls for the new 
acts to be subjected to the scrutiny of the new Joint Committee on Human 
Rights.363  It is too early to comment on the implementation of the Stronger 
Futures initiatives, but the preliminary assessment of Australia’s 
methodology through the development phase shows a troubling tendency to 
repeat the mistakes of the recent past.  Once again, as with NTER, there are 
                                                      
359 See Nicholson et al., supra note 19.  See also the website of the group Concerned Australians, 
supra note 348, for transcripts of consultation meetings; Stronger Futures Forum Held at Maningrida on 
21 February 2012, supra note 351. 
360 Buckmaster & Ey, supra note 268.  There is some evidence suggesting that NTER welfare reforms 
had had some positive effects in making communities feel stronger, more sustainable and safer, particularly 
for women and children, but researchers have cautioned against reliance on the data without further 
research to counter the limitations of available evidence.  See also NTER EVALUATION REPORT 2011, supra 
note 171; AIHW REPORT, supra note 259.  On the other hand, there is evidence that many current 
participants do not understand the purpose of the scheme or why they are on it, that it has not caused them 
to change their spending habits or feel safer, and that they feel shame and a loss of dignity when using the 
BasicsCard and dealing with income managers.  See Women’s Experience of Income Management in the 
Northern Territory, supra note 233. 
361 NTER EVALUATION REPORT 2011, supra note 171, at 333-34. 
362 Social Security Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) (Austl.). 
363 See, e.g., Stronger Futures Assessment supra note 351; Congress Statement: Passage of the 
Stronger Futures Bills, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AUSTRALIA’S FIRST PEOPLES, June 29, 2011, 
http://nationalcongress.com.au/congress-statement-passage-of-the-stronger-futures-bills/ (last visited July 
11, 2012).  
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concerns about a failure to facilitate genuine participation in decision-
making in line with the standards embodied in UNDRIP, and the continued 
reliance on special measures to justify the blanket imposition of top-down 
measures is a worrying sign that the move to Stronger Futures has 
perpetuated and not cured the discriminatory origins of NTER.   
Indeed, there is a real danger that the widely held perception that this 
is simply the Intervention being continued under another name will obscure 
community perceptions of the Stronger Futures policies; that no matter how 
progressive and beneficial they might be on their own terms, or how genuine 
the government’s motives are in implementing them, community 
engagement will remain on the back foot because they are contaminated by 
the distrust and disillusionment engendered by the Intervention. The 
paramount importance of genuine and meaningful two-way consultations 
with communities cannot be overstated.  Consultations are not just a 
formality to be ticked off a list, and it is unfortunate that moves to 
incorporate the HREOC guidelines for meaningful consultations into the 
legislation were not successful.364 
 
V.  SUMMARY AND FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
A. Recapitulation: UNDRIP and Self-Determination 
The right to self-determination is now unequivocally recognized as a 
right of indigenous peoples.  Article 3 UNDRIP explicitly claims for 
indigenous peoples what was previously denied them by excluding them 
from the meaning of “all peoples” in international law.  This provides an 
opportunity to unify competing understandings of the right and resolve 
inequalities, drawing on established norms while smoothing over historical 
areas of contention.  This article advocates interpreting self-determination in 
a manner specific enough to be capable of useful application in any given 
case, but flexible enough to accommodate different circumstances: as the 
right of peoples to control their own affairs through meaningful participation 
in decision-making and freedom from discrimination.  
This fundamental relationship between non-discrimination and 
participation on the one hand and the right to self-determination on the other, 
exists both in the latter’s traditional form under general international law and 
in the indigenous context.  The consistent foundation of participation and 
non-discrimination shows that indigenous self-determination and traditional 
self-determination share the same origins and rationale, and are not as 
                                                      
364 Stronger Futures Senate Hansard 2012, supra note 183, at 72-73, 126-28.  
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divergent as some maintain.  The scope of self-determination for indigenous 
peoples must also be interpreted as equal: there is no reason to restrict it to 
internal self-determination, because external self-determination is already 
tightly circumscribed for everyone under international law.  The alternative 
approach that views self-determination as a matter of substance and remedy, 
instead of internal and external aspects, supports this argument.  Secession 
by indigenous peoples is unlikely, but equality in the range of remedies 
available is vital, if the international community is genuine in its acceptance 
of indigenous peoples as “peoples.” 
This article has argued that UNDRIP supplements the long-established 
foundations of self-determination by adding a crucial element of 
empowerment to the indigenous rights framework, particularly through its 
enhanced standards of internal participation and informed consent that 
complement and transcend established norms of political participation.  The 
shift towards empowerment is inherent in the hard-won confirmation, after 
decades of battling over the “s,” 365  that indigenous peoples are indeed 
“peoples,” equal to “all peoples,” and entitled to the same rights.  UNDRIP 
recognizes that indigenous peoples may need preferential treatment in some 
circumstances–not to live better than anyone else, but merely so they can 
“‘live like’ everyone else.”366  It strengthens the indigenous rights framework 
by bringing the standards together in one place, and has also had an impact 
on the development of human rights law more generally.367  
Practically speaking, the specifics of self-determination will be 
worked out on a case-by-case basis at national, regional and local levels.  
The simple definition of self-determination advocated in this article helps 
facilitate that task.  A flexible interpretation of the right to participation and 
the continuum of options for its expression, and a commitment by the state 
to genuine freedom from discrimination, will mean that enjoyment of these 
two rights together is sufficient to guarantee empowerment and self-
determination as required by UNDRIP.  It will require good faith 
negotiations between indigenous representatives and states to define the 
exact parameters of the exercise of the right alongside other peoples in each 
case.368  Litigation will also undoubtedly play a central role.369   
                                                      
365 Wiessner, supra note 4, at 116-17. 
366 “Declaration Press Release,” supra note 48 (quoting David Choquehuanca, Bolivian Foreign 
Affairs Minister). 
367 XANTHAKI, supra note 29. 
368 See Murphy, supra note 2.  Contrast Scott, supra note 25 (arguing that negotiating relationships is 
at the core of what it means to be self-determining), with Quane, supra note 31 (arguing that the notion of 
self-determination as something to be negotiated, instead of absolute, is a new development).  
369 See Clive Baldwin & Cynthia Morel, Using the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in Litigation, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UNDRIP, supra note 12, at 121-43. 
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B. Lessons from Australia 
In the second part of the article, the NT Intervention came under 
scrutiny as a controversial example of domestic efforts to address indigenous 
disadvantage that arose the year UNDRIP was adopted by the G.A.  The 
interpretation of self-determination developed in the first part of the article 
was applied as the normative criteria for examining Australia’s NTER 
methodology in light of evolving international norms.  Questions of legal 
obligation aside, it is clear that Australia’s treatment of its indigenous 
peoples in NT was a denial of self-determination, as it persisted in 
“criminalising poverty”370 while applying paternalistic methods that denied 
indigenous peoples the opportunity for genuine engagement in conditions of 
equality.  NTER as a whole, and the compulsory income management 
regime in particular, violated the well-established prohibition on racial 
discrimination, did not amount to special measures, and fell well short of the 
enhanced standards of internal participation under UNDRIP.   
Australia claimed that the Intervention represented a radical new 
strategy for the protection of indigenous Australians’ rights. 371  
Unfortunately, any positive effects of the “stabilisation” and “normalisation” 
phases of NTER were ambiguous at best,372 and certainly not attributable to 
the decision to proceed in a racially discriminatory manner without any 
attempt at consultation; by contrast, the negative effects of Australia’s 
approach have been significant.373  Rather than a new approach, history 
seemed to be repeating itself in Australia, 374  with Aboriginal rights 
protections taking a step backwards despite the progress being made at the 
international level.  
The point of this article has not been simply to condemn the 
discriminatory and paternalistic aspects of NTER as an obvious example of 
how not to proceed, however.  Its contribution is to serve as a warning and a 
plea, that the same mistakes must not be continued as Australia leaves NTER 
behind and transitions to the new Stronger Futures.  With the legislative 
                                                      
370 Watson, supra note 143, at 4, 14. 
371 Second Reading NTER, supra note 161, at 10; Billings, supra note 141. 
372 AIHW REPORT, supra note 259; CIRCA REPORT 2009, supra note 183; Watson, supra note 143; 
Cobb, supra note 30; Billings, supra note 141.  See also NTER EVALUATION REPORT 2011, supra note 171.  
373 See Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory: Monitoring Report January-June 2011, DEPT. OF 
FAMILIES, HOUSING, CMTY. SERVICES AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sites/default/f
iles/documents/05_2012/ctg_nt_monitoring_rpt_pt1_janjun11.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2011); Gillard 
Can't Face Gruesome Intervention Facts–Sydney Protest Planned, STOP THE INTERVENTION, June 10, 2011, 
http://stoptheintervention.org/facts/press-releases/gillard-cannot-face-gruesome-intervention-facts-sydney-
protest-planned-10-6-11 (last visited Oct. 16, 2011); NTER EVALUATION REPORT 2011, supra note 171.  
374 Billings, supra note 141; Billings, supra note 166; Sutton, supra note 166; Chesterman & Douglas, 
supra note 2. 
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package replacing NTER having just been passed, Australia must not lose 
this opportunity to turn self-determination into something more than a 
distant memory of a failed experiment in Australian indigenous policy.375  
Self-determination must be given a chance.376   
The bottom line is that the socio-economic problems in NT will never 
be solved without genuine empowerment, and commitment to an ongoing 
partnership:  “[y]ou cannot drive change into a community and unload it off 
the back of a truck.”377  Australia must make concerted efforts to show that 
its endorsement of UNDRIP in 2009, and the national apology,378 were more 
than mere political gestures, and to demonstrate a commitment to doing 
what works in the long term.  As Little Children Are Sacred said, the 
problems in Aboriginal communities are not new, and the answers are 
obvious–“everybody knows the problems and solutions.”379  Australia has all 
the tools it needs to implement the standards of non-discrimination, 
participation and self-determination in UNDRIP.  It is a matter of political 
will as to whether all the advice is acted upon.   
Current steps towards constitutional amendment, 380  options for 
increasing indigenous political representation, 381  and the long-awaited 
establishment of a national indigenous representative body 382  all have 
                                                      
375 Past state attempts to establish Aboriginal self-determination in remote communities tended 
towards separatism, an approach still favoured by current opponents of Aboriginal self-determination.  See, 
e.g., Johns, supra note 57; Partington, supra note 141.  Such attempts exacerbated problems because they 
were not coupled with adequate support and systems of accountability.  See Etherington, supra note 150; 
Megan Davis, The ‘S’ Word and Indigenous Australia: A New Variation of an Old Theme, 31 AUS. J. 
LEGAL PHIL. 127 (2006).  
376 Behrendt, supra note 183, at 127. 
377 Review Board Report, supra note 24, at 58. 
378 On February 13, 2008, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd did what his predecessor Howard had 
refused to do and apologized to the Aboriginal peoples, on behalf of Australia, for the Stolen Generations.  
The text of the apology is available at http://www1.aiatsis.gov.au/exhibitions/apology/sorry.html. 
379 Little Children are Sacred, supra note 14, at 13. 
380 See Larissa Behrendt, Indigenous rights and the Australian Constitution: a litmus test for 
democracy (Conference Papers, Constitutions and Human Rights in a Global Age: An Asia-Pacific 
Perspective, 2001), available at http://rspas.anu.edu.au/pah/human_rights/papers/2001/Behrendt.pdf; Garth 
Nettheim, Indigenous Australian Constitutions, 24 UNIV. NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 840 (2001); Barbara Ann 
Hocking, Scott Guy & Jason Grant Allen, Three Sorries and You’re In? Does the Prime Minister’s 
Statement in the Australian Federal Parliament Presage Federal Constitutional Recognition and 
Reparations?, 11 HUM. R. REV. 105 (2010).  In December 2010, Australia established an Expert Panel to 
consult on constitutional recognition of indigenous Australians.  The Panel’s report was delivered to the 
Prime Minister on January 19, 2012.  FINAL REPORT OF THE EXPERT PANEL, RECOGNISING ABORIGINAL 
AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER PEOPLES IN THE CONSTITUTION, http://www.youmeunity.org.au/final-report 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2012). 
381  See Sanders, supra note 125; Murphy, supra note 2; EMRIP REPORT, supra note 273. 
382  Sanders, supra note 125; HREOC, Our Future in Our Hands: Creating a Sustainable National 
Representative Body for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, AUS. HUM. RTS. COMM’N (2009), 
available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/repbody/report2009/index.html (last visited Apr. 7, 
2011); CERD REPORT 2010, supra note 203; See the website of the National Congress of Australia’s First 
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potential to strengthen human rights protection for Aboriginal Australians, 
and to help bring Australia into line with the emerging norms of 
international law under UNDRIP.  But with suggestions in 2011 that a 
“second Intervention” might be contemplated to address spiralling crime in 
Alice Springs, 383  the importance of engagement and learning from past 
mistakes cannot be overstated.  The idea of a second Intervention does not 
seem to have taken hold as such, but numerous people have expressed the 
view that the Stronger Futures legislation amounts to just that–“it is using a 
different name, but the formula is the same”384–with Australia choosing to 
retain and extend various objectionable features of the Intervention in its 
new legislation despite serious opposition.  From the early indications it 
could not be said that Stronger Futures facilitates indigenous self-
determination in NT, and it seems likely that the new legislation will be 
challenged. 
C. Broader Implications 
Of more general relevance internationally, NTER analysis shows that 
measuring a state’s compliance against established international standards of 
non-discrimination and participation may in some cases be enough to assess 
whether the goal of indigenous self-determination is being achieved.385  This 
has the potential to open up avenues for redress that might otherwise be 
denied because the state refuses to recognize a legal obligation in respect of 
self-determination itself.  Although the question of remedies is beyond the 
scope of this article, it is worth noting that states like Australia do not help 
themselves by inhibiting the substantive self-determination of their 
indigenous peoples, because that is when contentious issues of remedial self-
determination arise.386  UNDRIP itself contains numerous provisions on the 
right to redress that will become increasingly important as the indigenous 
rights framework develops.387 
It goes without saying that implementing UNDRIP is the next 
significant challenge for advancing indigenous rights, in Australia and 
around the world.  It will not be easy, and it will not happen quickly.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Peoples, http://nationalcongress.com.au/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).  It is hoped that the National Congress 
will have more success than the ill-fated Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, which was 
abolished in 2005. 
383  Patricia Karvelas, Tony Abbott Calls For New Intervention in Alice Springs, THE AUSTRALIAN, 
Mar. 21, 2011. 
384  See Stronger Futures Forum Held at Maningrida on 21 February 2012, supra note 351. 
385  The relevant standard of participation will depend on whether the state is party to ILO Convention 
169 and therefore legally bound to ensure internal as well as political participation. 
386 See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text. 
387 E.g., arts. 8(2), 11(2), 20(2), 28, 32(3). 
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Changes to the status quo need to take account of the combined legal and 
political nature of the issues involved. 388   More generally, states must 
recognize that increased partnership with indigenous peoples will only 
strengthen and serve democracy and stability within their territories, not 
undermine it.389  Indigenous self-determination should not be seen as an 
unachievable dream, or a mere “indulgent fantasy.” 390   The immense 
political complexities involved will not dissolve overnight, and UNDRIP 
does not yet have legally binding status, but it must be seen as providing 
significant impetus for what Daes calls “belated state-building.”391  Models 
for success already exist, 392  and the literature is full of suggestions for 
implementation.393  Indeed, there are sure signs that UNDRIP is starting to 
have some impact.394 Indigenous peoples themselves will and must play a 
central role in the ongoing development of their rights framework, and 
through UNPFII, they now have a permanent voice at a high level of the 
UN.  The adoption of UNDRIP was the culmination of a long struggle, but it 
is just the beginning of indigenous re-empowerment.  
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